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Abstract 
 
It has been proposed that autism is fundamentally a disorder of social relatedness. Severe 
deficits in theory of mind (ToM) - or the ability to understand that other people can have 
mental states different from our own and that these mental states influence behaviour – are 
commonly thought to explain the social-communicative deficits seen in autism spectrum 
disorders (ASDs). If deficits in ToM are responsible for the impairments found in ASD, these 
deficits should be found amongst all individuals with ASD (universality) and must be present 
throughout the course of the disorder (stability). It should also be possible to use ToM ability 
to devise a dimensional rating of ‗level of functioning‘ within ASD. In light of ever greater 
prevalence estimates, it is imperative to understand the presentation of ToM deficits and their 
stability or development throughout the different subgroups of ASD in order to devise 
guidelines on nosology, intervention and management of the disorder. Additionally, the 
proposed changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which 
will combine the different ASD diagnoses into one category, raise the need to reliably 
differentiate between ASD ‗phenotypes‘. Using a comprehensive ToM battery, I examined 
the universality and stability of ToM in order to establish whether ASD children of different 
ages and abilities could be differentiated into relatively distinct groups of ToM ability. This 
was done by looking at the presence of ToM skills in the current DSM diagnostic categories 
(low and high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified [PDD-NOS]), how these skills changed with age, and 
whether any obvious patterns of ToM ability emerged. The low and high-functioning autism 
and PDD-NOS groups displayed severely delayed ToM skills, with the low-functioning group 
scoring the lowest on ToM tests and the PDD-NOS group the highest. Surprisingly, the 
Asperger‘s syndrome group performed equivalently to the typically developing group on all 
the ToM tests. A cluster analysis showed three distinct clusters of ToM ability corresponding 
roughly with moderate to severe autism, high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome. 
Regarding stability of ToM over time, it was found that ToM develops at a rate comparable to 
typical development in high-functioning autism, PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome. The 
low-functioning autism group was the only group that did not display any obvious 
development in ToM. In terms of nosology, the results highlight major problems with the 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. Firstly, the PDD-NOS group did not have a uniform profile for 
ToM or general cognitive abilities. Secondly, while diagnostic problems plague the category 
of Asperger‘s syndrome, large differences in ToM ability were found within higher 
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functioning ASD, within which I include high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and 
PDD-NOS. These results show the need to differentiate this very high functioning, relatively 
socially capable group from high-functioning cases with a more typical autism presentation. It 
is recommended that the diagnostic criteria be revised or that, if the ASD subgroups are to be 
grouped into a single autistic disorder category, dimensional categories within this diagnosis 
need to be made.  
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Introduction 
 
The disorders that fall along the autism spectrum are characterized by impairments in 
communication and socialization, and the presence of restricted or repetitive behaviours 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). It has been proposed that autism is fundamentally 
a disorder of social relatedness (Kanner, 1943; Wing & Gould, 1979). To understand the 
extreme social aloofness, passivity in social interaction and oddness of interaction that is seen 
at varying levels throughout the autism spectrum, individuals with autism‘s cognitive 
understanding of social situations and their own and others‘ mental lives have been 
extensively studied (see, for example, Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1997). Severe deficits 
have been found in social cognition, or theory of mind (ToM), and these deficits have been 
proposed to underlie the social-communicative impairments seen in autism spectrum 
disorders (ASDs; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  
 What has received relatively little attention within the last three decades of theory of 
mind research is how the different subgroups within autism spectrum disorder compare with 
each other on ToM skills, and whether, or to what extent, ToM is able to develop within 
autism. Understanding the profile of ToM skills, and the development of these skills, in the 
different subgroups of ASD development is important from a theoretical perspective; the 
criteria for classification as a primary deficit are universality, specificity and stability 
(Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). Therefore, if deficits in ToM are central to autism, these deficits 
should be found amongst all individuals with autism, must be specific to autism, and must be 
present throughout the course of the disorder. ToM deficits are not specific to autism; these 
deficits are also found in individuals with schizophrenia and traumatic brain injuries, and in 
late-signing deaf individuals (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006); however, it has been proposed 
that the severity of ToM deficits found in autism may be unique to the disorder. This study 
concerns the other two criteria for primacy: stability of ToM and universality within ASD. 
Once the universality of ToM and its development is known, it may be possible to use ToM 
ability to devise a dimensional rating of ‗level of functioning‘ within ASD. Such a 
dimensional rating scale has immense practical significance: greater ToM skills have been 
associated with better social skills and decreased severity of autistic symptoms. ToM skills 
therefore have an impact on diagnosis, intervention and management of the disorder. Thus, 
the overarching goal of the study was to investigate whether children of different ages, 
abilities and ASD subgroups could be differentiated into relatively distinct groups of ToM 
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ability. Such a level of functioning system will become particularly important if, as has been 
proposed, the various ASDs are grouped into a single autistic disorder category. 
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Review of the Literature 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
ASD is an umbrella term that includes the pervasive developmental disabilities autism, 
Asperger‘s syndrome and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified, as well 
as the relatively rare conditions Rett‘s disorder and childhood disintegrative disorder. These 
conditions are all characterized by (1) deficits in social interactions, (2) impaired verbal and 
non-verbal communication, and (3) repetitive, restricted or stereotyped behaviours, interests 
and activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Notably, ASD is four times more 
likely to affect boys than girls (Kogan et al., 2009) 
The text revision of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) defines autistic 
disorder, or autism, as a developmental disorder whose onset must be prior to 3 years of age 
and in which all three core aspects of ASD must be present. Individuals with autism can be 
divided into high-functioning and low-functioning groups. Low-functioning autistic 
individuals have an IQ of below 70, and therefore fall in the intellectually disabled range, 
while high-functioning autistic individuals have an IQ higher than 70. 
Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome are similar to those with high-functioning autism 
in that they show impaired social interaction and communication, along with restricted and 
repetitive behaviour, and average intelligence. However, for a diagnosis of Asperger‘s 
syndrome to be made, there must be no delay in the onset of language abilities. Rett’s 
syndrome is characterised by apparently normal development up until the age of 5 months, at 
which time there is a deceleration of head growth, loss of previously acquired purposeful 
hand skills and social engagement, and severe to profound psychomotor retardation with 
severely impaired language and poor coordination. Childhood disintegrative disorder is 
characterised by apparently normal development for at least the first 2 years, followed by a 
clinically significant loss of previously acquired skills before the age of 10 years in at least 
two of the following areas: language, social skills or adaptive behaviour, bowel or bladder 
control, play and motor skills. As part of the autism spectrum, this disorder features social and 
communicative impairments along with the presence of restricted, repetitive or stereotyped 
behaviour patterns, interest or activities. However, it cannot be better accounted for by 
another specific pervasive developmental area or Schizophrenia. Individuals with pervasive 
developmental disorder-not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) show severe impairments in 
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social interaction, associated with verbal or non-verbal communication deficits or repetitive 
and stereotyped behaviours, but do not meet the criteria for any specific pervasive 
developmental disorder. This may be because of the late onset of these deficits, or because of 
symptomatology that is atypical or subthreshold. For the full criteria for autism and 
Asperger‘s syndrome, see Appendix A. 
The prevalence of autism spectrum disorders in South Africa is not known. A review 
done in 2003 estimated that the prevalence of ASD internationally is ―at least 27.5 in 10 000‖ 
(Fombonne, 2003, p. 373). A recent study has reported a prevalence rate in the US of 110 in 
10 000 (Kogan et al., 2009). The prevalence of autism is thought to be between 10 and 30 
children in 10 000 (Baird et al., 2006; Fombonne, 2003; Kogan et al., 2009), with low-
functioning autism making up approximately 70 percent of these cases and 30 percent of the 
entire ASD population (Chakrabarti & Fombonne, 2005). The rate of Asperger‘s syndrome is 
estimated at 2.5 in 10 000. The majority of the remaining children with ASD have PDD-NOS 
as Rett‘s syndrome and Childhood disintegrative disorder are extremely rare (both 0.2 – 0.4 in 
10 000; Fombonne, 2003; Kozinetz et al., 1993). These alarmingly high rates highlight the 
need to understand the causes as well as the cognitive and behavioural aspects of ASD to 
inform intervention and management strategies. In particular it is important to include PDD-
NOS as, although it is by far the most prevalent of the ASDs, it is – besides childhood 
disintegrative disorder – also the least studied (Matson & Boisjoli, 2007). 
 
Changes to the DSM classification of ASD. In light of the upcoming release of the 
fifth edition of the DSM, the proposed changes to the diagnostic categories falling within the 
autism spectrum, and the reasons for those changes, will briefly be discussed. Recent studies 
have found considerable disagreement between clinicians‘ diagnoses of autism, Asperger‘s 
syndrome and PDD-NOS. For instance, in a survey of 466 professionals reporting on 348 
cases, Williams et al. (2008) found that 44% of children given Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-
NOS, atypical autism, or ―other ASD‖ labels actually fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for autism. 
Differentiating between high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome has proven to be 
especially controversial. The main problems of the current diagnostic system will firstly be 
discussed. Secondly, the proposed changes to the ASD diagnostic categories in the DM-V 
will be outlined. 
One of the problems of the DSM-IV diagnostic categories is the similarity between 
high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome. The differentiating factor between these 
two diagnoses, namely, the presence of a language delay, is difficult to establish when making 
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a diagnosis in late childhood or even adulthood, and many have argued that this criterion is 
not a reliable indicator of aetiology, current presentation or outcome (Howlin, 2003; Prior et 
al., 1998; Swedo, Thorsen, & Pine, 2008). Furthermore, the argument has been raised that 
even in cases where language development is not delayed, it may not be normal – parents of 
no-speech-delay ASD children report more echolalia, pronoun reversal and pragmatic 
language deficits than parents of typically developing children (Eisenmajer et al., 1996). Even 
more problematic is that, although the earliest reports of Asperger‘s syndrome report lesser or 
different social impairments than those seen in autism, the degree of social-communicative 
impairment that is necessary for a DSM diagnosis of autism or Asperger‘s syndrome does not 
differ. This is highly problematic because while language should not be delayed in Asperger‘s 
syndrome, the DSM-IV does not exclude from a diagnosis of autism individuals with intact 
language development (as long as there are communicative impairments, which could be 
difficulties in initiating and sustaining conversation). As a diagnosis of autism takes 
precedence over a diagnosis of Asperger‘s syndrome, some researchers have argued that a 
diagnosis of Asperger‘s syndrome is therefore almost never valid as these individuals meet 
the social-communicative impairment requirements for a diagnosis of autism (Mayes, 
Calahoun, & Crites, 2000).  
Rett‘s disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder and PDD-NOS are similarly 
problematic categories. Rett's disorder patients often have autistic symptoms for only a brief 
period during early childhood. Furthermore, the cause of Rett‘s disorder, a very specific 
genetic mutation, is now known (Amir et al., 1999) and therefore its inclusion in a manual for 
behavioural symptoms is no longer valid. The American Psychiatric Association has therefore 
concluded that the label of ASD is not appropriate for most individuals with Rett‘s disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, n.d.). Childhood disintegrative disorder was included in 
the DSM-IV to stimulate research in this area. However, research has not succeeded in 
finding a distinction between the presentation or outcome of childhood disintegrative disorder 
and autism with developmental regression. Furthermore, it has proven difficult to establish 
whether development was typical before the onset of the disorder (American Psychiatric 
Assocation, n.d.). Regarding the diagnosis of PDD-NOS, Matson and Boisjoli (2007) very 
accurately state that PDD-NOS ―is often diagnosed by what it is not (not autism), as opposed 
to what it is‖ (p. 75). Besides the assertion that individuals with PDD-NOS should not meet 
the criteria for any other pervasive developmental disorder, there are no specific criteria for 
PDD-NOS in the DSM-IV and, as such, presentation may vary widely from severe but 
atypical disability to very mild presentation. Perhaps for this reason, research has not been 
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forthcoming for this category. The problems in establishing well-defined and distinct 
diagnostic categories that would stimulate research have lead to major revisions in the 
classification of these pervasive developmental disorders in the DSM. 
In addition to the problems with diagnostic criteria that have been discussed, research 
has not been able to confirm qualitative differences between the subgroups, even though 
quantitative differences in functioning and symptomatology can be seen (Macintosh & 
Dissanayake, 2006; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; Meyer & Minshew, 2002; Miller & Ozonoff, 
2000; Witwer & Lecavalier, 2008). In other words, though individuals with Asperger‘s 
syndrome may have better language skills and individuals with PDD-NOS fewer symptoms 
than those with autism, the cognitive profiles are similar throughout the ASD subgroups and 
all subgroups show the same triad of impairments. Therefore, early drafts of the newly revised 
DSM-V propose that Asperger's syndrome, PDD-NOS and childhood disintegrative disorder 
be subsumed into the existing autistic disorder category and Rett‘s disorder be removed from 
the DSM entirely (Swedo et al., 2008).  
 
 This study will use the DSM-IV categories autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-
NOS. Because childhood disintegrative disorder and Rett‘s syndrome occur so infrequently in 
the population, and because Rett‘s syndrome is no longer considered to be part of ASD, these 
categories will not be studied. The goal in using the DSM-IV categories in this study (though 
they will soon not be used anymore) is to see whether the groups can be differentiated on 
ToM performance. If clear profiles for the different subgroups do not emerge on ToM testing 
after controlling for factors such as general intellectual ability, as have been found on other 
cognitive measures (for example, Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; Noterdaeme, Wriedt, & Höhne, 
2009; Thede & Coolidge, 2007), this would lend support to the reclassification of ASD into a 
single category.  
Furthermore it is foreseeable that the proposed diagnostic changes will impact on the 
educational and healthcare systems. Though having one diagnostic category will solve much 
of the confusion surrounding appropriate diagnoses and will emphasize the similar nature 
(and possibly aetiology) of the ASDs, it will create a new set of problems that need to be 
addressed.  ASD as a whole is an extremely heterogeneous group, and a single category is too 
broad to be of use as an indicator of disability, outcome, or best treatment. As will be 
discussed, individuals with ASD vary widely in their intellectual ability, in their social 
interaction and communication skills, and in their abilities to perform activities of daily 
living. Some classification method will therefore be necessary to distinguish between 
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individuals at different levels of severity of the disorder. I suggest that the next important goal 
in ASD research will be to identify homogenous subgroups not only for research purposes, 
but to permit meaningful educational placement and intervention strategies. This 
classification system should follow a dimensional rather than categorical approach as was 
previously used (autism, Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS, etc.). The benefits of a 
dimensional classification system are that it (1) acknowledges a continuum of skills, (2) 
allows growth, and (3) provides an indication of outcome. 
 A dimensional rating system for DSM-V autistic disorder has been proposed, as shown 
in Table 1, but the greatest problem with this proposed classification system is that a fixed 
way of measuring this has, to my knowledge, not yet been proposed. People‘s opinion of what 
is considered ―substantial support‖ may differ between places, cultures or individuals. A fixed 
way of measuring level of functioning is needed to ensure that all classification is consistent 
across studies, clinics or continents.  
Table 1.  
Proposed Dimensional Ratings for DSM-V Autistic Disorder 
Dimensional Ratings 
for DSM-V ASD 
Social Communication Fixated Interest and 
Repetitive Behaviours 
Requires very 
substantial support   
Minimal social communication Affects most activities; 
resistance to interference 
Requires substantial 
support 
Some social communication but 
noticeably disrupted 
Frequent, interfering 
Less severe Even with support, noticeable 
impairments 
Occasional, some 
interference 
Subclinical symptoms Clear impairments but more positive 
skills 
Odd or excessive but no 
interference 
Normal variation Maybe awkward or isolated but 
within normal limits 
Within normal limits for 
developmental level and no 
interference 
Note: Proposed DSM-V ratings as of January 2011 (C. Lord, personal communication, 
January 19
th
, 2011). 
 
 A different type of classification system using a measurable factor that can be 
standardised, for instance ToM, may be a better approach to the problem of establishing fixed, 
universally acknowledged dimensional categories. For ToM to be useful as an indicator of 
level of functioning it must be able to discriminate different groups within ASD, it must serve 
as an indicator of adaptive functioning, and it must have recognised norms for different 
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developmental levels. ToM, its association with social and adaptive functioning, and its 
development in typically developing children and children with ASD will be discussed next. 
 
Theory of Mind 
ToM refers to the ability to understand that other people can ―want, feel and believe 
things‖ (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985, p.38) and to recognize that these mental states 
influence people‘s behaviour. The false belief paradigm has predominantly been used to test 
ToM (Fodor, 1992), as it is a reliable and easy way to test whether participants understand the 
distinction between thoughts and the real world. The classic false belief test used by Wimmer 
and Perner (1983) and Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985), the ―Sally-Anne test‖, shows 
Sally placing a marble in a basket and leaving the room. While she is away, Anne removes 
the marble from the basket and hides it in a box. Participants are then asked, ―When Sally 
returns, where will she look for the marble?‖ The question is answered correctly (i.e., ―in the 
basket‖) if the participant understands that Sally‘s belief does not represent the reality of the 
situation. This understanding of other people‘s beliefs is called first-order belief attribution.  
It is assumed that ToM should be positively correlated with social competence. After 
all, for social reciprocity it is necessary to understand that other people have mental lives 
which, even though they are not visible, constantly affect their actions, and that these mental 
lives may be different from our own (Dennett, 1989).  
 
 ToM and social competence. There is some evidence that individuals‘ ToM skills are 
related to their social competence. A series of studies have found associations between ToM 
and social competence in typically developing children (see Bosacki & Wilde Astington, 
2001; Repacholi & Slaughter, 2003), and several studies with ASD participants found that 
increased ToM was related to better social skills and fewer ASD symptoms and maladaptive 
behaviours (Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, Frith, & Happé, 1994; Frith, Happé, & Siddons, 
1994; Lerner, Hutchins, & Prelock, 2010). Similarly, Travis, Sigman and Ruskin (2001) 
found that joint attention and increased empathy were associated with lesser degree of 
impairment in social interaction in individuals with ASD. However, it seems that the 
relationship between ToM and social competence is a complex one: Frith et al. (1994) found 
that children with ASD who passed false belief tasks showed greater social insight, but no 
more simple sociability, and Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) found that although ToM was  
correlated with communicative competence, it could not explain the variance in the severity 
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of social impairments or repetitive behaviours in ASD. Hence, it is unclear whether ToM 
represents a higher-order elaboration of the fundamental empathic abilities that are impaired 
in autism, or whether it is an independent cognitive module that is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for social competence (see Leslie & Frith, 1990). 
To summarise, the association between social skills or social reciprocity and ToM is not 
clearly delineated – it would seem that ToM is necessary for social skills, but does not 
guarantee social competence; perhaps because a variety of ToM skills are needed for social 
competence. Research has recently begun to address this by examining multiple aspects of 
ToM, such as understanding of desires, emotions, and intentions, as well as precursors to 
ToM, such as pretend play and joint attention. A developmental examination of ToM skills 
and its cognitive influences follows.  
 
The development of ToM. As emotions, desires, beliefs and intentions are all internal 
states it is conceivable that these might all be equally hard to understand, or that children from 
different backgrounds, and with different sets of experiences, might understand some types of 
mental states before other children do. Yet studies of ToM development from around the 
world show that, for all people, some mental states are harder to understand than others, and 
point to a similar trajectory in the development of ToM (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). This universal developmental trajectory is present even in traditional 
hunter-gatherer societies who have had very little contact with Western culture (Avis & Paul 
L. Harris, 1991). 
ToM and its precursors develop from a very young age. From 14 to 24 months of age, 
typically developing children start to engage in pretend play and show joint attention (i.e., 
looking at an object a parent is looking at; U. Frith & C. D. Frith, 2003). Pretend play and 
joint attention are argued to be precursors to ToM (Leslie, 1987). The ability to engage in 
pretend play shows that the child is aware of mental concepts and the distinction between 
what is real and what is imaginary. Joint attention is critical for social reciprocity as it 
requires an understanding of another person‘s intent, and a desire for sharing interest or 
enjoyment (Charman et al., 2000). At around age 2 years, children spontaneously begin to talk 
about their own mental states, express desires, and show an understanding of other people‘s 
desires (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Between 3 and 5 years old, children begin to understand 
others‘ false beliefs, differences between appearance and reality, and their own previous false 
beliefs (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Naito, Komatsu, & Fuke, 1994). Between 5 and 7 years 
old, children are able to understand second-order beliefs: In other words, they grasp that a 
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person can have beliefs about other people‘s beliefs (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, 
Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). The difference between jokes and lies begins to be 
appreciated by 6-10-year-olds, as are language forms such as metaphor, sarcasm and irony 
(Ackerman, 1981; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; M. R. Pollio & H. R. Pollio, 1979). This is an 
important indicator of ToM ability, as these language forms require an understanding of the 
speaker‘s intent. From 9 to 11 years old, children are able to recognize social faux pas, for 
example saying to a parent, ―You have a lovely daughter‖, when their child is in fact a boy 
(Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). Although ToM is clearly a 
complex set of skills, which is likely to continue to develop throughout the lifespan, ToM 
development after this point has not been studied.  
 
Cognitive factors associated with ToM development. The aim of this study is not to 
investigate the potential causes and correlates of ToM. However, it is important to note which 
factors are associated with ToM task performance, as these factors could confound results 
when working with different clinical groups who may have various impairments beside ToM. 
Numerous studies have reported correlations between language development and ToM 
in typical and clinical samples (see Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007 for a review). Milligan 
et al. (2007) reported significant correlations between false belief performance and receptive 
vocabulary, semantic and syntactic knowledge, general language skills and memory for 
complements. It may be that these various linguistic skills are necessary for ToM to develop 
(Astington, 2001; Astington & Jenkins, 1999); conversely, that ToM is necessary for 
language learning (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001); or it may be that there is a bidirectional 
relationship between ToM and language development (Slade & Ruffman, 2005). Whatever 
the relationship between ToM and language may be, it is important to be aware of language 
skills when assessing ToM. 
Various aspects of executive functioning have also been correlated with ToM 
performance. Executive functioning is an umbrella term that includes a wide array of skills 
such as planning, judgement, inhibitory control, mental flexibility and generativity 
(Schneider, Schumann-Hengsteler, & Sodian, 2005). Correlations between the executive 
functions inhibition, cognitive flexibility (set shifting), working memory, planning, verbal 
fluency and ToM performance have been found in typical development (Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Hughes, 1998; Perner & Lang, 1999; Sabbagh, Xu, 
Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006) as well as in various clinical samples (Greig, G. J. Bryson, & 
Bell, 2004; Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietswaart, & Summers, 2006; Joseph & Tager-
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Flusberg, 2004; Pellicano, 2007; Perner, Kain, & Barchfeld, 2002; Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, 
& Archibald, 2000; Wong, 2004). Proposed explanations for the observed correlation between 
executive functions and ToM include that both of these are linked to the development of other 
skills (e.g., language); that skills such as inhibition and working memory are necessary to 
reason about false beliefs as, for example, the belief needs to be held in mind and the desire to 
mention the real world state (rather than the character‘s false belief) needs to be suppressed; 
and that ToM is an important influence on the development of executive functions (Hughes, 
1998). As many papers have noted deficits in executive function in autism, including deficits 
in shifting between instructions, generativity and processing speed (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; 
Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Perner et al., 2002; Verté, Geurts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan, & 
Sergeant, 2006; Wong, 2004), these skills are again  important to be aware of when assessing 
ToM.  
 
ToM still remains a problematic concept – much like ASD it is an umbrella term which 
includes a variety of mental concepts, which have been poorly defined in the literature. This 
applies especially to the ‗upper‘ and ‗lower‘ ends of ToM – what would be the easiest task 
that still requires imputation of mental states, and on the other hand, when does ToM 
development end? At the same time, there are behaviours that are clearly essential for social 
reciprocity that do not necessarily require a ToM, such as making eye contact. Any attempts 
at examining social competence by measuring ToM must keep such conceptual problems in 
mind. It is also important to be aware of the fact that ToM, or at least ToM task performance, 
may be influenced by cognitive skills such as inhibition and verbal ability. It is unlikely that 
ToM has a general cognitive substrate. For example, some non-human primates are capable of 
tactical deception and display causal knowledge of predator behaviour (evidence for ToM), 
yet do not display higher or cognitive and verbal abilities (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten, 
1997; Zuberbühler, 2000).  However, ToM tests such as the false belief task have traditionally 
required that the participant be able to comprehend questions and respond appropriately, and 
hence completion of the task itself may have required verbal skills. By including a greater 
variety of ToM tests it is hoped that a more accurate picture of an individual‘s ToM may be 
obtained and that performance on a variety of ToM tests will be a good indication of social 
competence. Having explored ToM and its correlates in typically developing children, I now 
turn to the case of ToM in ASD. 
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ToM in ASD 
It is thought that both the social aloofness and oddness in social interaction seen in ASD 
stem from an inability to empathise with others and to understand that others have mental 
states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wing, 1981). This theory has mostly been tested using the 
cognitive paradigm of ToM, and indeed, a plethora of research has found that individuals with 
ASD show severe deficits in developing ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Holroyd & Baron-
Cohen, 1993; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). For instance, many children 
with ASD do not appear to understand the distinction between appearance and reality and are 
not good at recognizing mental state words such as ―think‖ and ―know‖. They also tend not to 
engage in pretend play or imitation, and may not follow the gaze of a speaker (Charman et al., 
2000). Although they may understand behaviour based on desires, children with ASD may 
struggle to understand complex causes of behaviour such as beliefs (Baron-Cohen & 
Swettenham, 1997). Furthermore, they tend to struggle with non-literal speech such as 
metaphor and irony (Happé, 1993). ASD children‘s ToM difficulties cannot be attributed to 
low IQ, as children with Down‘s syndrome have similar or lower IQ scores, but perform 
significantly better on false belief tests (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Thus, most ASD children 
show severe deficits in ToM ability that may be able to account for the social, communicative 
and imaginative deficits seen in ASD (Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1997).  In order to 
account for these deficits, ToM needs to be both stable (i.e., it should never develop to normal 
levels while a diagnosis of ASD still applies) and universal throughout ASD. The stability of 
ToM in ASD throughout the lifespan will firstly be discussed. 
 
Delayed or deviant development of theory of mind? Although most ASD individuals 
fail false belief tasks such as the Sally-Anne test, a significant proportion of autistic 
individuals (around 15 to 55 percent) do pass first-order false belief tests (Happé & Frith, 
1996). These individuals are usually older and have a higher verbal mental age than autistic 
individuals who fail first-order false belief tasks (Happé & Frith, 1996; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 
1994). This observation has led researchers to believe that individuals with ASD may have a 
specific developmental delay in ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 
1997). This hypothesis predicts that ToM skills develop in ASD, and develop in the same 
order as in typical development, but are present only at a much later chronological and even 
mental age than is found in typical development and in intellectual disability without ASD 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993). According to the theory of specific 
developmental delay, most individuals with ASD have ToM abilities equivalent to a 1-2 year-
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old typically developing child; that is, they do not show joint attention and imaginative play. 
Those individuals who display false belief reasoning skills are delayed at the next 
developmental level and therefore still display marked social and communicative impairments 
(Happé, 1994; Kaland et al., 2002), which are reflected in their difficulty in more naturalistic 
tests of social situations, such as the Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). 
Supporting the delayed development hypothesis, Happé (1995) found that all ASD 
individuals with a verbal mental age of 11 years 9 months passed first-order false belief tasks. 
Given that ASD individuals who pass ToM tests are older and have a relatively high verbal 
ability, it follows that children with higher functioning ASD may show ToM development 
(albeit delayed), while low-functioning children never achieve false belief reasoning skills.  
The delayed development hypothesis is also supported by the findings of a longitudinal 
study by Steele, Joseph, and Tager-Flusberg (2003), in which autistic children, aged 4 to 14 
years, showed significant improvement in ToM abilities over the course of 1 year. Further 
evidence for developmental delay comes from Paynter and Peterson (2009), who found 
increased performance on ToM tasks with increasing age and mental ability (both verbal and 
nonverbal) in children with high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome.  
 In contrast to these results, longitudinal studies by Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994) and 
Holroyd and Baron-Cohen (1993) found no improvement in false belief scores of individuals 
with ASD at, respectively, 3 and 7 years after baseline testing. Their participants did not show 
increases in nonverbal mental ability either, although overall the group did show a significant 
increase in verbal ability (increased verbal skills were not seen in all participants, however). 
These results suggest a ceiling effect in the development of ToM, and therefore a deviance in 
development. One explanation for these contrasting results might be that Steele et al. (2003) 
used a more developmentally sensitive test battery, rather than only false belief tests: for 
instance, they included tests for early developing aspects of ToM, such as desire-based action 
tasks. Indeed, those researchers found that most of the improvement took place between early 
ToM and first-order ToM abilities, which could not have been measured by the false belief 
tests used in the other two studies. The results from Holroyd and Baron-Cohen (1993) and 
Happé (1995) also suggest an association between general cognitive ability and ToM task 
performance. Hence, it could be that Steele et al. (2003) and Paynter and Peterson (2009) used 
higher-functioning children in their samples, and that this was the reason for the improvement 
seen by these researchers. 
Studies have also examined the delay vs. deviance argument by looking at 
developmental sequences within ToM performance. The delayed development hypothesis 
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requires that a similar developmental trajectory is seen in ASD as in typical development; 
with pretend play preceding emotion attribution, which precedes false belief reasoning, and so 
forth. Sparrevohn and Howie (1995) found such a developmental progression in children with 
autism on tasks ranging from inferred belief to second-order false belief. Unfortunately, they 
did not have a control group to compare this performance to, and neither did they follow these 
children across time to see if their performance improved.  
Two studies that examined performance on a range of ToM tasks support deviant rather 
than delayed development in autism. Peterson, Wellman, and Liu (2005) found that 
individuals with high-functioning autism, aged 6 to 14 years, showed a different ToM 
developmental pathway to both typically developing children and deaf children with a ToM 
deficit. Although all children showed the same developmental sequence for acquiring early 
ToM abilities, children with ASD found the false belief task more difficult than a hidden 
emotions task, while typically developing, late-signing deaf and native signing deaf children 
found the hidden emotions task the most difficult. So, although both autistic and deaf children 
have deficits in ToM, this study suggests that deaf children follow the same developmental 
pattern as typically developing children, whereas autistic children may follow a different 
developmental pattern, which may be unique to autism. These results on the hidden emotion 
task have not been replicated as yet. 
Serra, Loth, van Geert, Hurkens, and Minderaa (2002) studied ToM development in 4-
6-year-old children with PDD-NOS compared with controls matched on verbal and non-
verbal mental age. They found that development of ToM abilities had taken place in the PDD-
NOS group 6 months after baseline testing, but that this development was markedly slower 
than in the typically developing control group, and was not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the developmental pattern between the groups differed considerably. While the 
typically developing group showed a relatively stable phase followed by rapid increase in 
ToM scores, the PDD-NOS group showed a pattern of increase, decrease, and increase again 
before stabilizing. Burack and Volkmar (1992) have noted that children with ASD are more 
likely to show developmental regressions than are typically developing children, and low-
functioning autistic children are more likely to show developmental regressions than are high-
functioning autistic children.  
The studies on ToM progression in ASD thus far support both a delayed and deviant 
hypothesis for ToM development. ToM development seems to occur in at least some 
individuals with ASD, but it is slower and possibly follows a different developmental pattern 
to ToM in typically developing children. The results from the longitudinal studies by Holroyd 
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and Baron-Cohen (1994) and Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994) further point to a possible plateau 
in ToM development in ASD.  
In summary, at least some findings suggest that ToM deficits may not be as stable as 
was previously thought, and that ToM may develop in certain individuals or subgroups of 
ASD. However, one argument against the hypothesis of specific developmental delay is that 
some skills that develop soon after birth in typically developing children, such as eye contact, 
may continue to be absent in ASD, even when individuals pass ToM tasks. A possible 
explanation for this seemingly contradictory finding is that, as ASD individuals who pass 
false belief reasoning tasks require much greater chronological and verbal mental ages than 
typically developing children, these children might solve ToM tasks using language skills and 
general cognitive processes rather than specific mental state processes, or innate ToM skills 
(Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Individuals with ASD activate different 
brain regions to control subjects when answering ToM questions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2008) 
and take longer to answer ToM questions than typically developing individuals, which points 
to reasoning out the answer rather than understanding emotions and beliefs (Kaland, Smith, & 
Mortensen, 2007). These results suggest that compensatory skills may increasingly be used by 
older children with ASD. However, there is currently little evidence on which to base 
developmental theories, and much of the research suffers from the fact that either only certain 
subgroups of ASD are included, or that performance is not differentiated by subgroup (see 
Table 2 for a summary of studies examining ToM development in ASD). Hence, it is unclear 
whether ToM skills are similar throughout ASD or whether certain clusters of ToM ability are 
present. The profile of ToM skills in the different ASD subgroups will be discussed next. 
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Table 2. 
Summary of the Studies Investigating Development of Theory of Mind in Autism Spectrum Disorders 
Study Groups Study Type N Age 
range 
Tests Results 
Holroyd & Baron-
Cohen, 1994 
LFA 7-8 year follow-up 17 6-16
a 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 order FB  No significant difference 
in ToM scores 
Ozonoff & 
McEvoy, 1994 
HFA, PDD-NOS 3 year follow-up 34 10-23
a 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 order FB, 
Double Bluff 
No significant difference 
in ToM scores 
Paynter & 
Peterson, 2009 
HFA, AS, TD Cross-sectional 63 4 - 13 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order FB 
 
Significant increases in 
ToM with age. ToM 
ability predicted by 
syntactic ability.  
Steele, Joseph & 
Tager-Flusberg, 
2003 
Autism
b 
1 year follow-up 57 4 – 14a Desire, Pretend Play, 
Perception-Knowledge, Sticker 
Hiding, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order FB, 
Lies and Jokes, Traits, Moral 
Judgement 
 
Significant increases in 
ToM. 
Note. Only studies that compared children at different ages were included in this table. 
ToM = theory of mind, FB = false belief, HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
a
 Age at first assessment 
b
 This group included both low-functioning and high-functioning children Un
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Differences in ToM within the autism spectrum. Thus far, ToM has been described 
within ASD in general. However, as varying degrees of symptomatology, verbal ability and 
intellectual disability have been described between the different subgroups, it follows that 
level of ToM may also differ within subgroups. Of particular importance is whether 
differences in ToM exist even when cognitive ability is accounted for; this would suggest 
fundamental taxonomic differences in groups‘ ‗autisticness‘ and would therefore support the 
idea of different diagnostic groups within autism. In the long run, understanding the 
fundamental differences between ASD subgroups, if indeed there are any, may provide clues 
as to whether the ASDs are due to similar or different causes.  
High-functioning and low-functioning autism. Most of the research has focused on 
these groups, particularly the high-functioning autism group, as participants from this group 
are easy to obtain and test. As has been noted, a certain level of verbal ability seems to be 
required to be able to pass first-order false belief tasks. Therefore, as children with high-
functioning autism have higher verbal ability scores than children with low-functioning 
autism, this group generally performs better on ToM tests (Dyck, Ferguson, & Shochet, 
2001). 
High-functioning autism and Asperger’s syndrome. Descriptions of individuals with 
ASD often highlight differences in social behaviour between Asperger's syndrome and high-
functioning autism. Individuals with Asperger's syndrome have been described as having an 
'active but odd' personality style, in comparison with most children with autism who are 
'passive and aloof' (Wing, 1981). Unlike individuals with autism, they often desire friendships 
and romantic relationships, and show more advanced social reactions, for example in 
greeting, showing affection and taking pleasure in social interactions (Frith, 2004; 
Ghaziuddin, 2008). Given the importance of social communication, both in daily life and in 
the diagnosis of ASD, remarkably few studies have compared high-functioning autism and 
Asperger's syndrome individuals on formal tests of ToM. 
The vast majority of studies investigating ToM in ASD without concurrent intellectual 
disability make no distinction between high-functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome. 
This trend was followed earlier in the literature review with the discussion of delay and 
deviance in ToM because of this paucity in the literature. However, an examination of the 
similarities and differences in ToM between high-functioning autism and Asperger's 
syndrome is warranted here, particularly in the light of the proposed changes to the DSM.  
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To my knowledge, only eight studies have compared high-functioning autism and 
Asperger's syndrome, three of which have been published within the last two years, when the 
proposed changes to the DSM were announced. Of the eight, four studies have found 
differences in ToM (Kuroda et al., 2011; Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991; Paynter & 
Peterson, 2009; Ziatas, Durkin, & Pratt, 1998) -  with the Asperger‘s syndrome group 
performing better than the high-functioning autism group - and four studies found no 
differences in ToM ability (Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Dissanayake & Macintosh, 
2003; Klin, 2000; Spek, Scholte, & Berckelaer-Onnes, 2009). It should be noted however that 
Dissanayake and Macintosh (2003) did find differences between the groups on first-order 
false belief tasks, but when using only the children who passed these tasks, did not find 
differences between the groups on second-order false belief. Similarly, Klin (2000) used only 
children who had already passed second-order false belief tasks in his study. If ToM ability is 
better developed in Asperger‘s syndrome than in high-functioning autism, as some of the 
studies suggest, this procedure may have unintentionally biased the selection so that the high-
functioning autism individuals participating had greater theory of mind skills than is normally 
found within this group.  
  Another difficulty in comparing the studies is that different tests of ToM and different 
diagnostic criteria for Asperger‘s syndrome were used. Some studies used the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 2001) to aid in 
diagnosis, other simply report that diagnosis was done by a psychologist or psychiatrist 
according to DSM criteria, and Ozonoff et al. (1991) allowed children with Asperger's 
syndrome who had language delays, and thus according to the DSM-IV criteria should be 
diagnosed with autism or PDD-NOS. Of the eight studies, two used first-order false belief 
and/or basic emotion attribution tasks (Paynter & Peterson, 2009; Ziatas et al., 1998), three 
used first- and second order false belief tasks (Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Dissanayake 
& Macintosh, 2003; Ozonoff et al., 1991) and three used advanced theory of mind tasks, 
including Strange Stories, interpreting a television clip, and attributing emotions to geometric 
shapes ( Klin, 2000; Kuroda et al., 2011; Spek et al., 2009). The details of tests and diagnostic 
procedures used can be found in Table 2. Integrating these results, the trend seems to be that 
individuals with Asperger‘s syndrome perform better than individuals with high-functioning 
autism on basic ToM tasks, but not on more advanced ToM tasks (but see Kuroda et al., 
2011). However, there is clearly still a need to compare high-functioning autism and 
Asperger‘s syndrome on a variety of ToM tests of different difficulty levels in order to 
interpret previous contradictory results. 
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Table 3. 
Summary of the Studies Comparing Theory of Mind in High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome 
Study Sample Size Age range Tests ToM Results 
Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 
1996 
HFA, AS = 20 6 – 16 1st and 2nd order FB AS = HFA < TD 
Dissanayake & Macintosh, 
2003
a 
HFA = 21, AS = 19,  
TD = 20 
5 - 11 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order FB  
Social Behaviour 
1
st
 order FB: HFA < AS = TD 
2
nd
 order FB: HFA = AS = TD 
Social Behaviour: AS = HFA < TD 
Klin, 2000
a 
HFA, AS, TD = 20 HFA: 20.5 (10.8) 
AS: 18.9 (11.8)
b
 
Social Attribution Task AS = HFA < TD*\ 
Kuroda et al., 2011 HFA = 17, Other 
PDD  
(AS & PDD-NOS) = 
11, TD = 50 
16 - 45 Describe TV character‘s mental 
state from visual or auditory 
information 
HFA < AS = TD 
Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 
1991 
HFA = 13, AS = 10 8 – 21 1st and 2nd order FB HFA < AS = TD 
Paynter & Peterson, 2009 HFA = 19, AS = 24,  
TD = 20 
5 - 12 1
st
 order FB, 
Belief-Emotion 
HFA < AS = TD 
Spek, Scholte & Berckelaer-
Onnes, 2009 
HFA = 32, AS = 29,  
TD = 32 
18 - 60 Strange Stories 
Faux Pas 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Empathy Quotient 
AS = HFA < TD 
Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 1998 HFA, AS, TD, SLI = 
12 
HFA: 8.5 (2.7) 
AS: 6.11 (2.1)
b 
1
st
 order FB 
Belief Term Comprehension & 
Expression 
HFA < AS = TD = SLI 
Note. ToM = theory of mind, FB = false belief, HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, TD = typical development, SLI = 
specific learning impairment 
a
 Denotes studies that have used only children who passed false belief tasks 
b 
Age ranges were not reported for these studies; means and standard deviations are given
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ToM in PDD-NOS. Very little research has been done on ToM in PDD-NOS. There is 
some evidence that children with PDD-NOS perform equally well on basic emotion 
recognition tasks (Serra, Jackson, van Geert, & Minderaa, 1998) and on emotion role-taking 
tasks (Serra et al., 1995) as IQ-matched controls. However, most studies that have compared 
PDD-NOS and typically developing children suggest that, like children with autism, children 
with PDD-NOS are impaired on various ToM and emotion-recognition  tasks (Buitelaar, van 
der Wees, Swaab–Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999; Serra et al., 2002; Sicotte & Stemberger, 
1999). 
 As far as I am aware, only two groups have compared ToM performance in PDD-NOS 
with that in autism; that of Begeer and colleagues and Buitelaar and colleagues. Buitelaar and 
colleagues found no difference between the PDD-NOS and autism groups on emotion-
recognition, first or second-order false belief (Buitelaar et al., 1999; Buitelaar, van der Wees, 
Swaab-Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999). Begeer and colleagues found that children with 
autism and children with PDD-NOS performed similarly poorly on correcting an examiner‘s 
false belief, but that the PDD-NOS group‘s performance increased when promised a reward, 
whereas the autism group‘s performance did not change (Begeer, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & 
Stockmann, 2003). These results suggest that ToM deficits might be milder in PDD-NOS than 
in autism, but more research is necessary to confirm this, especially since the studies 
conducted thus far have only used children with high-functioning PDD-NOS and autism 
(barring Sicotte & Stemberger, 1999). This means that previous results may not apply to the 
groups as a whole. 
  
To summarise, numerous studies have found that children with ASD show severe 
deficits in ToM compared with both typically developing and intellectually disabled children, 
which throws doubt on the notion that ToM is based on some uniform cognitive substrate or 
ability. Within ASD, the pattern of ToM performance is less clear. Children with high-
functioning autism seem to outperform children with low-functioning autism on ToM tasks, 
possibly because of the poorer verbal skills found in the latter group. Few studies have 
compared the relatively new DSM-IV diagnostic categories of PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s 
syndrome to autism. Interpretation of study results are also obstructed by diagnostic criteria 
that have been vaguely defined or that differ between studies. Hence, much controversy still 
exists over whether ToM ability is equivalent in high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s 
syndrome. Research suggests that individuals with Asperger‘s syndrome perform better than 
individuals with high-functioning autism on basic ToM tasks, but not on more advanced ToM 
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tasks. PDD-NOS cases seem to have the same impairment in ToM as is found in autism, 
though these deficits may be less severe. Because of the paucity of information in this area it 
is important not only to compare these diagnostic categories before joining them into a single 
category, but also – specifically because of diagnostic difficulties that exist -  to look at 
naturally occurring groups of ToM skills or disability, regardless of diagnostic category.  
With regard to development, some evidence has been presented that ToM skills may 
develop in ASD. However, results from the initial studies are contradictory as to whether the 
developmental sequence for ToM is the same in autism as in typical development and whether 
ToM development may plateau in ASD. Clearly more research is needed to understand how 
stable ToM is across the lifespan in individuals with ASD.  
In light of changes to the DSM classification from five diagnostic categories to one 
autistic disorder category, a new dimensional classification method will become necessary to 
distinguish between individuals at different levels of severity of the disorder. ToM ability 
might be one way to identify such homogenous subgroups within autistic disorder: it reflects 
some of the core problems of socialization and communication in ASD, which are associated 
with the adaptive functioning of individuals. Thus, this study aims to establish whether ASD 
children of different ages and abilities can be differentiated into relatively distinct groups of 
ToM ability. This will be done by looking at how ToM skills in ASD change with age, and by 
endeavouring to identify clusters of ToM ability within ASD. These clusters may correspond 
to current DSM diagnostic categories, or may suggest new dimensional classifications in 
ASD. In short, this study examined whether any obvious patterns of ToM ability exist, both 
cross-sectionally and in terms of development. 
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Rationale for Research 
Stability of ToM 
It is still unclear to what extent ToM development takes place in children with ASD, 
and whether ToM development is prevalent and similar throughout the spectrum. As far as I 
am aware, no study has investigated ToM development in all the different subgroups of ASD. 
The results of previous studies on ToM development have also been contradictory: recent 
studies with large sample sizes and, in particular, young participants have found significant 
increases in ToM, while longitudinal studies with long follow-up periods have found no 
differences in ToM over time. Clearly, more research is needed using a wide variety of ToM 
tests to be able to identify development. Specifically, a large improvement in ToM is seen 
during the preschool years in typical development. I therefore aimed to include young, 
preschool-aged participants in my ASD sample. The following questions regarding ToM 
development were asked: 
(1) Do ToM abilities develop in children with ASD? 
(2) If ToM development does take place, is this development limited to high-functioning 
autistic and Asperger‘s syndrome children, or does it occur in all ASD participants? 
(3) Furthermore, if ToM development does take place in children with ASD, how does it 
compare with ToM development in typically developing children in terms of  
(a) rate of development,  
(b) age of onset of early-developing ToM abilities 
(c) highest level of ToM obtained (i.e., is there an observable plateau in ToM 
development in children with ASD)?  
ToM Universality and its Profile in the ASD Subgroups 
In light of the proposed decision to merge the DSM –IV categories autism, Asperger‘s 
syndrome and PDD-NOS into a single autistic disorder category, I aimed to establish whether 
ASD children of different ages and abilities could be differentiated into relatively distinct 
groups of ToM ability. If no clusters of ToM ability emerge after confounding cognitive 
variables are factored out, this lends credence to the idea of a singular autistic disorder 
category. If clusters similar to the present DSM diagnostic categories emerge, it should give 
us pause before combining the different diagnostic categories into a singular category. Lastly, 
if clusters of ToM ability emerge, but these do not correspond to the current diagnostic 
categories, it indicates that a new diagnostic classification may need to be devised.  
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Particular attention is focussed on the controversial DSM categories of Asperger‘s 
syndrome and PDD-NOS. I examined whether there are observable differences in ToM 
between high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome and whether a homogenous ToM 
profile exists for the category PDD-NOS.  
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Methods 
 
Research Design 
The study was an existing groups-comparison and was divided into two sections: a 
cross-sectional comparison of five groups; low-functioning autism, high-functioning autism, 
Asperger's syndrome, PDD-NOS, and a typically developing control group. A cross-sectional 
study can show that older children have greater ToM skills than younger children, but cannot 
prove beyond doubt that development took place as different groups of children are tested. A 
group of children were therefore reassessed on the ToM tasks after 1 year. Because of time 
constraints, a smaller sample of 10 children was chosen. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Western Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng 
provinces. Convenience and snowball sampling were used to obtain participants for the study: 
firstly, autism-specific, special needs and mainstream schools were approached to obtain 
participants; secondly, autism support groups were contacted; and thirdly existing participants 
were asked to identify potential suitable candidates for the study.  
All ASD participants were diagnosed by qualified clinicians independent of this study. 
Participants with a diagnosis of autism were further divided into the categories of low-
functioning or high-functioning autism based on their IQ. Autistic participants with an IQ of 
70 or below were in the low-functioning autism group, while participants with an IQ of higher 
than 70 were in the high-functioning autism group. 
All participants were between the ages of 4 and 16 years. This age range was chosen as false 
belief reasoning should be present by 4 years of age. As the most difficult tasks were 
appropriate for typically developing 11-year-old children, the cut-off age of 16 years was 
chosen so that if delayed development does take place in ASD, the oldest children might be 
able to pass the advanced ToM tasks. The 10 children chosen for follow-up were all 
diagnosed with high-functioning autism and were between the ages of 5 and 10 years. I chose 
this group as this age range was most likely to show development. A high-functioning autism 
group was also the easiest to access and test, and previous research suggested that this group 
was likely to show improvements in ToM (e.g., Steele et al., 2003).  
 Inclusion and exclusion criteria. To be included in the ASD group, participants had 
to have been diagnosed with ASD by a clinician independent of this study. Children with a 
history of head injury or infantile meningitis were excluded from the study. ASD candidates 
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with additional neurological conditions were excluded from the study, as were control 
candidates with any neurological conditions. Individuals with any serious social deficits, such 
as conduct disorder (CD) or oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), a communication disorder, 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or any pervasive developmental disorder, or 
a history of these disorders, were excluded from the typically developing control group. This 
information was obtained through the demographic questionnaire (see Appendix B). A further 
condition was that all participants had to be fluent in English or Afrikaans. 
 
Ethical considerations. This study followed the ethical guidelines for research with 
human subjects outlined by the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) Codes for Research. Permission was obtained from the 
relevant provinces‘ Education Departments and schools to approach their students to 
participate in the study (Appendix C). 
Written informed consent was obtained from the participants‘ parents or guardians 
beforehand, and informed assent was obtained from the participants on the day of testing (see 
Appendix D). Participants were assured that data would be kept confidential, and would only 
be used for research purposes. This study involved minimal risk and no potentially harmful 
tasks were involved. The only possible risk was that children could become uncomfortable or 
fatigued during testing. Children were allowed to take a break between tasks if they became 
tired and could withdraw from the study with no negative consequences if they no longer 
wished to take part. Parents were given written feedback regarding their child‘s performance 
after the study.  
 
Initial sample. One hundred and ninety seven children were volunteered to take part in 
the study, of which 162 had ASD. In the ASD group, 29 participants were excluded 
immediately because they were non-verbal, 17 because they had additional neurological 
disorders besides ASD (meningitis, Landau-Kleffner syndrome, ataxic cerebral palsy, vision 
problems), two because of a previous head trauma, and one because of an incorrect diagnosis. 
In the typically developing group, three children were excluded because of a diagnosis of 
attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder and one because of a previous language delay. 143 
children therefore participated in the research. 
The ASD participants were matched as closely as possible with typically developing 
children on age, gender, socio-economic status and home language.  
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Procedure 
Testing took place at the participant‘s school or home, or if such an arrangement could 
not be made, at the Department of Psychology. Participants were tested individually in a quiet 
room free of distractions. It was planned that testing would take place over two sessions of 
approximately 45 minutes each for children younger than 6 years, and 80 minutes each for 
children 6 years of age and older. However, in the case of preschool children and children 
with ASD – specifically the low-functioning group – more and shorter sessions were often 
used.  
During the first session, the Comprehension of Instructions task was administered. 
Children had to correctly complete at least two-stage verbal instructions on this task to be 
included in the rest of the study. Next, tests of general intellectual functioning, working 
memory and processing speed were administered. In the second session, the ToM tasks and 
the executive functioning tasks Verbal Fluency and Colour-Word Interference were 
administered. During the assessment of ToM, printed stories with accompanying pictures 
were left in front of the child to minimize memory and linguistic demands. Details on the tests 
are given below. 
The 10 children who were identified for follow-up were contacted again one year later 
and were tested once more on the ToM and general cognitive measures. 
 
Measures 
 A variety of tasks assessing general cognitive functioning and ToM skills were used for 
the research. These tests were not developed or normed in South Africa. However, this should 
not affect the interpretation of the results, as the control group provided a benchmark of what 
a typically developing South African child‘s performance should be like. 
 
 Comprehension of instructions. The Comprehension of Instructions task from the 
NEPSY-II (Schmitt & Wodrich, 2004) was administered to all ASD participants. The 
Comprehension of Instructions task was developed for children aged 3-16 years and assesses 
the ability to receive, process, and execute oral instructions of increasing syntactic 
complexity.  
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Cognitive ability. 
General intellectual functioning. To assess general intellectual functioning, the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was used for participants 
aged 6 years and older, and the third edition of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence (WPPSI-III; Wechsler, 2002) for participants younger than 6 years. All four 
subtests of the WASI were administered to obtain verbal, performance and full scale IQ 
scores. All the subtests of the WPPSI-III for 2-3 year olds were administered. A short form of 
the WPPSI-III for 4-7 year olds was administered to obtain verbal and full scale IQ scores 
(Sattler, 2008). For the 4-7 year olds‘ version of the WPPSI-III, the Vocabulary, Information 
and Similarities subtests were administered to obtain verbal IQ. Full scale IQ was calculated 
from participants‘ performances on the Information, Matrix Reasoning, Picture Completion, 
Symbol Search and Similarities subtests. 
Three subtests from the fourth edition of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
(WISC-IV UK; Wechsler, 2004) were administered to obtain a measure of working memory 
and processing speed. Performance on the Digit Span task was used as a measure of working 
memory. To obtain a measure of processing speed, the Coding and Symbol Search subtests 
were used.  
Executive functioning. The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, 
Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) measures key components of executive function. The Verbal 
Fluency and Colour-Word Interference subtests from this battery were administered. Verbal 
Fluency was used to measure both lexical and semantic generativity. The Colour-Word 
Interference task, which is based on the Stroop (1935/1992) test, was used to measure a 
participant‘s ability to inhibit an overlearned verbal response.  
 
Theory of mind. The ToM battery consisted of 11 ToM tasks that were divided into 
four modules of increasing difficulty. The ToM battery was adapted from that used by Steele 
et al. (2003), and used similar tests in the early and basic modules, but differed from these 
authors‘ battery in that the Perception-Knowledge task was moved from the basic to the early 
module in this study, as it was judged that this ability develops somewhat earlier than false 
belief reasoning. The Explanation of Action task was added to the basic module and two of 
the advanced tasks (namely, Traits and Moral Responsibility) were replaced with other tasks 
(Strange Stories and Faux Pas) that measure ToM ability directly, rather than performance on 
factors associated with ToM. Because of the large jump in difficulty level between the basic 
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and advanced modules, the battery was divided into four, rather than three, difficulty levels. 
This decision was taken so that children would not have to complete tests that were 
inappropriately difficult for their chronological or mental age, and to prevent children from 
becoming demotivated and unwilling to complete the assessment.  
The tasks included both test and control questions, with the exception of the Pretend and 
Sticker Hiding tasks. All tasks, except those using dolls and the advanced Faux Pas task, had 
accompanying pictures to minimize linguistic and memory demands. Participants‘ scores on 
the various ToM tasks were added to obtain a Total ToM score. All the tasks were also scored 
as pass or fail. 
Early module. For each of the tasks on the early module, participants had to get at least 
3 out of 4 questions right to obtain a pass. The Pretend Play task was designed for this study 
and tested the ability to use a doll as an independent agent in a pretend situation. The original 
task by Kavanaugh, Eizenman and Harris (1997) and Steele et al. (2003) was judged to be 
inappropriately female-gender stereotyped. In light of the fact that most children with autism 
are boys, the stories were changed to depict gender-neutral events. The task consisted of four 
structured play scenarios. Participants were asked to complete scenarios by acting out each 
event using the dolls (see Appendix E).  
The Desire task (Steele et al., 2003; Wellman & Woolley, 1990) tested the ability to 
predict behaviour based on a character‘s stated desire. The task contained two picture stories. 
In each of the two stories the protagonist looked for an object that was in one of two named 
locations. The character failed to find the object in the first location. Participants were asked 
what the character would do next and why.  
The Perception-Knowledge task (Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Steele et al., 2003) tested the 
ability to know that a character obtains knowledge from visual access. The task contained 
four control questions, alternated with four test questions in which one doll looked into a box 
and another pushed the box. The child was asked which doll knows what is inside the box.  
Basic module. The Location-Change False Belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983) contained two picture stories wherein an object is moved while the 
main character is out of the room. The child was asked whether the character knows where the 
object is, where the character would look for the object, and why the character would look 
there. To obtain a pass on this task, participants had to get at least 6 out of 9 questions right. 
In the Unexpected-Contents False Belief task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) 
participants were shown four familiar containers with unexpected contents inside. The child 
was asked, ―When you first saw the box, all closed up, what did you think was inside?‖ and 
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―When X comes into the room, and sees the box all closed up, what will he/she think is 
inside?‖ To obtain a pass on this task, participants had to get a score of at least 8 out of 12. 
The Explanation of Action task (H. B. Tager-Flusberg, personal communication, March 
14, 2008) contained 12 stories in which an action based on an emotion, desire, cognitive 
process (think, know or forget) or non-mental event was portrayed. The child was asked why 
the character performed the action. If the child was unable to answer, he or she was prompted 
with ―what is going on in [the character]‘s head when [the character performed the action]?‖ 
To obtain a pass on this task, participants had to get a score of at least 8 out of 12. 
The Sticker Hiding task (Devries, 1970) is a deception task wherein the participant is 
required to hide a sticker from the experimenter. This task was included as a naturalistic and 
non-verbal ToM test as it required the participant to take another person‘s perspective and 
knowledge into account in order to keep the location of the sticker a secret (for example, 
while the sticker would be hidden if only the hand containing the sticker were closed, it would 
be immediately obvious to an observer where the sticker is). The task started with six practice 
trials wherein the experimenter hid a sticker in one, both or neither hand so that the child 
would guess the location of the sticker correctly at least once, and incorrectly at least once. 
The child then hid the sticker for ten trials, of which the last five were scored for ability to 
hide the sticker from the experimenter. Points were given for (1) taking both hands behind the 
back to hide the sticker, (2) bringing both hands to the front, (3) keeping both hands closed 
until the experimenter has made a guess, (4) keeping the sticker completely invisible in the 
hand and (5) using a switching strategy for both guessing and hiding. To obtain a pass on this 
task, participants had to obtain a score of at least 16 out of 22. 
Intermediate module. The Second-Order False Belief task (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994) 
consisted of two picture stories, and tested knowledge of a character‘s beliefs about a second 
character‘s beliefs. The child was asked an ignorance (―Does Mom know what you are 
making her for Mother‘s Day?‖), belief (What does Mom think you are making her for 
Mother‘s Day?‖), and justification question. To obtain a pass on this task, participants had to 
get a score of at least 6 out of 8. 
Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) consisted of 18 illustrated stories of 13 types: non-mental 
inference (control), lie, white lie, joke, pretend, double-bluff, persuasion, forgetting, 
misunderstanding, figure of speech, appearance-reality, irony and contrary emotions. 
Participants were asked whether what the character said was true, and why the character said 
it. To obtain a pass on this task, participants had to get a score of at least 26 out of 36. 
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Advanced module. The Lies and Jokes task (Steele et al., 2003; Winner, Brownell, 
Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998) consisted of four picture stories, two of which contained a lie 
and two a joke. In each story, a child character said something that their parent knew to be 
untrue. In the joke version, the child character knew that the parent knew the truth, while in 
the lie version the child did not know that the parent knew the truth. Participants were asked 
whether the child‘s statement is a lie or a joke. To obtain a pass on this task, participants had 
to get a score of at least 12 out of 16. 
The children‘s version of the Faux Pas task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Stone, Baron-
Cohen, & Knight, 1998) was administered. This task contained five control stories which 
depicted a normal social event, and five test stories wherein a character said something 
awkward or embarrassing. After reading the story, participants were asked, ―Did anyone say 
something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?‖ If they responded yes, they were 
asked, ―Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?‖, ―Why 
shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?‖, and ―Why do you think he/she said 
it?‖. The original task by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1999) contained ten control and ten 
test questions. The test and control questions are the same in all respects, except for one detail 
that changes (a character either makes a neutral statement or makes an uncomfortable 
statement). However, it was thought that this repetition of stories could be confusing for 
children, causing them not to concentrate on the second story, or to give the same answers for 
both stories, which may not be correct for both versions. Therefore, the test was split into two 
versions (each containing five control and five test stories), so that if a certain test question 
was in Version A, its matching control was in Version B, and thus stories were not repeated. I 
alternated between the versions. To obtain a pass on this task, participants had to get a score 
of at least 28 out of 40. 
 
To keep the duration of the assessment short, but obtain a reliable measure of ToM 
ability, children started the ToM battery at the module most appropriate for their age or 
developmental level and continued until failing a module or reaching the end. Therefore, 
typically developing children between the ages of 3 and 5 years who, according to the 
international literature, should pass tasks like Pretend Play and Desire, started on the early 
ToM module. All children with autism and PDD-NOS also started on the early ToM module, 
and proceeded to the next module if they attained at least half the maximum score. Typically 
developing children between the age of 6-7 years and children with Asperger's syndrome 
started on the basic module, as it was judged that they should comfortably pass false belief 
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tasks. Typically developing children 8 years and older started on the intermediate module. 
The skills tested in this module, namely second-order false belief and understanding non-
literal speech, should be present in typical development by 6-7 years old. If participants who 
started on the basic and intermediate modules attained at least half of the maximum score, 
those children received full credit for the easier modules that they did not do and advanced to 
the next module until they reached the end or attained less than half of the maximum score. If 
children attained less than half the maximum score on their starting battery, they were tested 
on the previous battery. Wellman and Liu (2004) found that if children passed a more 
advanced ToM test, they passed all easier ToM tests. Thus, the validity of the results should 
not be affected by children not completing all the modules.  
All the aforementioned tasks were piloted in 2008 on typically developing and high-
functioning autistic children. The ToM battery was found to be appropriate for a South 
African context. The results of the pilot study are given in Appendix F. After the pilot study, 
some questions on the intermediate and advanced modules were adjusted to reduce language 
demands and be more culturally appropriate. Specifically, the Lies and Jokes task did not 
show a clear performance increase with age during the pilot study. It is possible that 
participants always interpreted the child character‘s statement, ―I did a really good job [on the 
task]‖, as a lie rather than as a joke because a joke seemed inappropriate in a setting where the 
child is talking to an authority figure. The phrasing of the Lie/Joke questions on this test was 
therefore changed to that in the adult version of this task. Instead of asking ―Was [the 
character] lying or just joking?‖, participants were asked ―Was [the character] lying so he/she 
wouldn‘t get caught, or joking because he/she was embarrassed?‖ I hoped that by including 
the speaker‘s motivation for the false utterance the distinction between lying and joking 
would be made clear, so that participants would not fail due to different cultural views of 
what is acceptable within a parent-child interaction, or different interpretations of the words 
lying and joking. Some of the words on the Strange Stories task were changed to similar 
words that would be known by South African children, for example ―John was in one of the 
cubicles in the bathroom at school‖ was changed to ―John was in one of the toilets in the 
bathroom at school‖. I also found that the meaning of the word awkward (used in the Faux 
Pas task) needed to be explained to participants beforehand. 
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Data Analysis 
All statistical analyses were completed using PASW Statistics version 18.0 (SPSS, 
2010) and Statistica version 9 (StatSoft, 2010). To explore the development of ToM ability, 
five separate regressions were performed (typical development, low-functioning autism, high-
functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS) with ToM as the dependent variable 
and Age as the independent variable. The correlation coefficients, slopes and intercepts of 
these regressions were compared using GraphPad Prism 5 (Motulsky, 1999). A t-test was 
used to compare ToM scores at initial assessment and follow-up 1 year later. 
To compare group performances on the ToM battery, a one-way analysis of variance 
was done on ToM score with Group (low-functioning autism, high-functioning autism, 
Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS, and typical development) as the independent variable.  An 
analysis of covariance was also conducted with age, verbal IQ, inhibition/set shifting, verbal 
generativity, digit span and processing speed as the covariates. The assumption for 
homogeneity of variance was not upheld, but the residuals were normally distributed, so the 
results of the analysis remain reliable. A K-means cluster analysis (non-hierarchical 
clustering) was used to group together cases by calculating the Euclidean distances between 
cluster centroids for performance on the various ToM tasks. G*Power version 3 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & A. Lang, 2009) was used to calculate effect sizes and achieved power. 
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Results 
Sample Characteristics  
Of the 113 ASD children who participated in the research, a further 21 were excluded 
because they could not correctly complete at least two-stage verbal instructions (―show me 
the big, happy bunny‖) on the NEPSY-II Comprehension of Instructions task (Schmitt & 
Wodrich, 2004), three children were too anxious to complete the tasks and two children did 
not complete the assessment. Only two children were excluded from the typically developing 
group; both because they did not wish to complete the tasks. The final sample therefore 
consisted of 86 children with ASD (21 low-functioning autism, 24 high-functioning autism, 
21 Asperger's syndrome and 20 PDD-NOS) and 30 typically developing children between the 
ages of 4 and 16 years. 
The groups were matched on as closely as possible on gender, age, language and socio-
economic status. Socio-economic status distribution within the sample was determined from 
annual household income, parental education level and number of household assets, as 
described in Myer, Stein, Grimsrud, Seedat, and Williams (2008). The list of household assets 
included items such as having access to running water, owning a fridge, having a credit card, 
and so forth. 
 
Language. There were significant differences in the distribution of home language 
between the groups. As the typically developing group was most representative of the 
language distribution in the Western Cape (Statistics South Africa, 2006), with  27% 
Afrikaans, 23% Xhosa, 47% English and 3% other home language speakers (compared with 
an estimated 41% Afrikaans, 29% Xhosa, 28% English and 2% other home language speakers 
in the Western Cape), the group differences found may be an indication that many children 
with ASD are either unidentified or misdiagnosed in certain language groups. This may be 
particularly true of the Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS groups, which were almost 
exclusively white and English speaking. The potential racial bias in diagnosis that was 
observed mirrors previous results from the US, where children with Asperger‘s syndrome and 
PDD-NOS are significantly more likely to be white and less likely to be Hispanic (Rosenberg, 
Daniels, J. K. Law, P. A. Law, & Kaufmann, 2009). 
 
General intellectual functioning. Although children in the high-functioning autism 
and Asperger‘s syndrome groups all had IQ scores in the non-intellectually disabled range 
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(bar one child diagnosed with Asperger‘s syndrome who had an IQ of 67), there was still a 
significant difference in full scale IQ between these groups and the typically developing 
group (p < .05). The high-functioning autism group had a lower average IQ score than the 
typically developing group, while the Asperger‘s syndrome group on average had a higher IQ 
than the typically developing group. The PDD-NOS group had the largest range of IQ scores, 
and included children with and without intellectual disability. All the children in the low-
functioning autism group had IQ scores of 70 and below, in the mild to moderate intellectual 
disability range.  
 
Age. The Asperger‘s syndrome group was slightly older than the other groups, though 
not significantly so. The older average age in this group reflects the older age at diagnosis for 
children with Asperger‘s syndrome. Howlin and Asgharian (1999) reported that in the UK the 
average age that parents seek medical help for children later diagnosed with Asperger‘s 
syndrome is 3.49 years and that, on average, the diagnosis is only confirmed at 11.13 years. 
The demographic characteristics for the sample are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4.  
Demographic Information for the Sample 
 LFA HFA AS PDD-
NOS 
TD F/χ2  Significance 
N 21 24 21 20 30   
Age      2.06 .091 
 Mean 10.37 8.91 11.12 9.68 9.28   
 SD 2.94 2.89 2.38 2.68 3.43   
 Range 5-16 5-16 7-15 5-13 4-16   
Sex      4.54 .338 
 Male 17 22 20 17 23   
 Female 4 2 1 3 7   
Home Language      29.79 .003
a 
 English 15 17 19 20 14   
 Afrikaans 2 3 1 0 8   
 Xhosa
 
3 2 0 0 7   
 Other 1 2 1 0 1   
SES      9.59 .295 
 Low 6 13 3 7 9   
 Medium 5 5 8 7 12   
 High 6 5 9 5 7   
 Did not disclose 4 1 1 1 2   
FSIQ      32.40 < .001 
 Mean 61.52 79.62 99.38 80.75 90.21   
 SD 6.58 8.19 13.55 11.34 14.73   
 Range 50-70  71-106 67-123 66-103 62-122   
Note. SES = socio-economic status, FSIQ = full scale IQ, LFA = low-functioning autism, 
HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
a
However, this result cannot be meaningfully interpreted because of the unreliability of Chi-
squared tests in the presence of empty cells.
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ToM Development 
 Typical development. The scatterplot for the typically developing group with age and 
ToM as the independent and dependent variables respectively is shown below. Theory of 
mind seems to develop rapidly within the first 9 years, after which development slows. 
Because the scatterplot seemed to indicate a nonlinear relationship, the runs test for 
nonlinearity (Motulsky, 1999) was conducted for all 5 groups. None of the regressions 
significantly deviated from a linear Age-ToM relationship however (all p > .05), indicating 
that the data were appropriate for a linear regression analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1. The correlation between theory of mind and age in typical development. 
Theory of mind seems to develop rapidly within the first 9 years, after which 
development slows. 
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Delayed versus deviant development in ASD. The development of ToM ability was 
examined (1) by looking at the performance on sequentially more difficult ToM tasks, (2) by 
comparing the time of onset of ToM abilities, as measured by the battery, in the ASD 
subgroups and (3) by comparing the different developmental rates of ToM in ASD.  
On average, all the groups did the best on the Pretend Play task and the worst on the 
Faux Pas task (see Table 5). Although there were small differences in the percentage of 
children within a group to pass the tasks, there were no large differences in the order in which 
the tasks were passed, which seems to indicate that ToM skills develop in the same order in 
ASD as in typical development.  
 
Table 5. 
Percentage of Participants Within Each Group Who Passed the Theory of Mind Tasks 
 LFA HFA AS PDD-
NOS 
TD 
Early Module      
 Pretend Play 65 92 100 100 100 
 Perception-Knowledge 10 52 91 70 100 
 Desire 25 56 91 65 90 
Basic Module      
 Sticker Hiding 20 68 91 65 100 
 Explanation of Action 30 40 100 70 90 
 Unexpected-Contents False Belief 15 32 91 65 93 
 Location-Change False Belief 5 12 91 65 90 
Intermediate Module      
 Strange Stories 0 4 62 10 50 
 2
nd
 Order False Belief 0 0 48 15 40 
Advanced Module      
 Lies and Jokes - 0 48 15 40 
 Faux Pas - 4 43 15 30 
Note. Passing criteria were set so that a pass indicated above-chance performance on the task. 
For specific passing criteria, see the Methods section. 
LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, 
PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical 
development 
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 In the typically developing group all of the children passed the tasks in the early 
module except for two children (one 4 and one 5 years old) who failed the Desire task. Sixty 
seven percent of 4-6 years olds and all children 7 years and older passed the false belief tasks. 
On Second-Order False Belief, most children passed from 8 years onwards. On Strange 
Stories, all children under 5 years failed, 50% of children between 5 and 10 years passed, and 
almost all children older than 10 years passed (only one older child failed). On Lies and Jokes 
and Faux Pas all children under the age of 8 years failed; the majority (75%) passed Lies and 
Jokes at 10 years and most children older than 12 years passed Faux Pas. The age ranges at 
which different ToM skills were present in the typically developing South African sample 
were therefore roughly consistent with previously reported international results (Brüne & 
Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1994; Wellman & Woolley, 1990).  
However, Table 5 shows that some ToM tasks were more difficult than other tasks in 
the same module. For instance, all the groups found the Desire task much more difficult than 
the other tasks in the early module, and more difficult even than some of the basic ToM tasks 
such as Sticker Hiding and Explanation of Action. Many of the children also found the 
Second-Order False Belief task more difficult than Strange Stories, though previous research 
suggested that second-order false belief is necessary to understand the difference between 
many non-literal statements, such as the difference between a lie and an ironic statement. 
Interestingly, the low and high-functioning autism groups performed much better on the 
Unexpected-Contents False Belief (Smarties) task than on the Location-Change False Belief 
(Sally-Anne) task, while the other groups performed similarly on both tasks.  
In summary, from comparing the ToM tests, it seems that ToM develops in the same 
order in ASD as in typical development, and that many children with ASD do show early 
ToM abilities such as pretend play and understanding perception-knowledge tasks. Next, 
development will be explored more directly. 
To analyse the rate of development and onset of ToM, five separate simple regressions 
were done (typical development, low-functioning autism, high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s 
syndrome, PDD-NOS) with ToM as the dependent variable and Age as the independent 
variable. The regression results are shown in Table 6.
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
 
Table 6. 
The Correlation Between Age and Theory of Mind for Typical Development and the Various Autism Spectrum Groups 
 
Regression R R
2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
TD Constant 
.738*** .545 
82.30 7.84    66.24 98.36 
Age 0.61 0.10 .74 5.80 < .0001 0.39 0.82 
 Constant 
.321 .056 
7.42 9.55    -12.57 27.40 
LFA Age 0.17 0.11 .32 1.48 .156 -0.07 0.41 
 Constant 
.613** .376 
7.73 11.35    -15.82 31.27 
HFA Age 0.61 0.17 .61 3.64 .001 0.26 0.95 
 Constant 
.512* .263 
83.88 17.65    46.95 120.8 
AS Age 0.51 0.20 .51 2.60 .018 0.10 0.92 
 Constant 
.592** .350 
25.13 19.03    -14.85 65.12 
PDD-NOS Age 0.79 0.25 .59 3.11 .006 0.26 1.32 
Note. Age is given in months; therefore the B coefficient for Age gives the increase in ToM score associated with 1 month‘s increase in age. 
‗Constant‘ gives the average estimated ToM score at 48 months. LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = 
Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
Dependent VariaDependent variable: ToM Total Score 
*p < .05, **p <  .*p < .05, **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
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ToM significantly increased with age in all the groups except for the low-functioning 
autism group. Overall, a chi-squared test showed no significant difference between the groups 
in the size of the correlation between age and ToM, χ2 = 4.34, p = .362 (Arsham, n.d.). 
Comparison of slopes and intercepts. Fischer‘s tests were used to compare the groups‘ 
slopes, or developmental rate of ToM, and intercepts, or time of onset of ToM abilities. I used 
4 years (48 months) as the intercept, as this was the youngest age included in the study. 
Figure 2 indicates this intercept with a vertical black line. 
Overall, there was no significant difference between the slopes of the groups, F (4, 106) 
= 1.85, p = .125, r = .13. However, from Figure 2 it seemed that the low-functioning autism 
group in particular deviated from the typically developing group in their rate of ToM 
development. These two groups were therefore compared, and a significant difference 
between their slopes, and hence between their rate of development, was found, F (1, 47) = 
7.07, p = .011, r = .36.  
 
Figure 2. Developmental trajectory of theory of mind. Significant increases in theory 
of mind were seen in high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome, pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified and typical development. Overall, there 
was a similar rate of development between the groups, but different times of onset. The 
vertical line at 4 years indicates the intercept. 
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Next, the groups‘ intercepts were compared. There was a significant difference between 
the groups‘ intercepts, or onset of ToM, F = (4, 110) = 69.64, p < .0001, r = .62. As can be 
seen from Table 6, at 4 years of age the typically developing group had a mean ToM score of 
82.30 (SD = 7.84), which corresponds roughly to a good understanding of first-order false 
belief and scattered performance on second-order false belief and understanding non-literal 
language. The low-functioning autism group had a mean ToM score of 7.42 (SD = 9.55) at 4 
years, and the high-functioning autism group had a mean score of 7.73 (SD = 11.35), both of 
which indicate an only marginally higher than chance performance on the early ToM battery 
(understanding desire, understanding seeing-leads-to-knowing, and showing pretend play). 
The Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS groups had mean ToM scores of 83.88 (SD = 17.65) 
and 25.13 (SD = 19.03) respectively. This corresponds to an understanding of ToM similar to 
that of typically developing children in the Asperger‘s group (F [1, 47] = 0.21, p = .65, r = 
.07), and an understanding of the early ToM concepts but not first-order false belief in the 
PDD-NOS group.  However, the regression for the PDD-NOS had a large standard error 
relative to the other groups, and when looking at the graph it can be observed that very few 
individual cases in this group perform as predicted by the regression equation. Rather, many 
cases are similar to that predicted for either Asperger‘s syndrome or the autism groups. 
In summary, the typically developing group and all the ASD groups except for low-
functioning autism displayed statistically significant increases in ToM with age. Overall, the 
groups did not differ significantly in their rate of ToM development; however, the low-
functioning autism group showed significantly slower ToM development than the typically 
developing group. All the ASD groups except for the Asperger‘s syndrome group showed 
delayed ToM skills at age 48 months, or 4 years old. From the mean scores at that age, it 
seems that ToM was especially delayed in the high-functioning and low-functioning autism 
groups. 
Longitudinal study. Ten high-functioning autistic children were followed up one year 
after the initial assessment to test whether any development of theory of mind took place 
during this period. A t-test showed that the children had significantly improved in ToM from 
Time 1 to Time 2, t (9) = -2.88, p = .018, Hedges‘ g = -0.84. Table 7 shows the pass rate at 
Time 1 and Time 2. At Time 2, five children passed the Desire task, whereas before none of 
the 10 had passed it, and three children passed the Perception-Knowledge who had not done 
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so at Time 1. Only 1 child who passed the Perception-Knowledge task at Time 1 failed the 
task at Time 2. All the children passed the Pretend Play task at both Time 1 and Time 2.  
 
Table 7. 
Number of Children Who Passed Each Theory of Mind Task at Time 1 and Time 2 
 Pass Year 1  Pass Year 2 
 N %  N % 
Early Module      
 Pretend Play 10 100  10 100 
 Perception-Knowledge 5 50  7 70 
 Desire 0 0  5 50 
Basic Module      
 Sticker Hiding 5 50  8 80 
 Explanation of Action 6 60  5 50 
 Location-Change False Belief 0 0  4 40 
 Unexpected-Contents False Belief 0 0  0 0 
Intermediate Module      
 2
nd
 Order False Belief - -  0 0 
 Strange Stories - -  0 0 
Advanced Module      
 Lies and Jokes - -  - - 
 Faux Pas - -  - - 
Note. The age range for the children who participated in the follow-up study was 5-10 years, 
with the average age being 8.08 years (at Time 1). Passing criteria were set so that a pass 
indicated above-chance performance on the task. For specific passing criteria, see the 
Methods section. 
 
On the basic module, one child passed the Explanation of Action task at Time 2 who 
had not passed previously; however, 2 children who had passed at Time 1 failed this task at 
Time 2. At Time 1, none of the children had passed either the Location-Change False Belief 
or the Unexpected-Contents False Belief tasks. Four children passed the Location-Change 
task at Time 2. None of the children passed the intermediate or advanced modules.  
In contrast to the results of the ToM tests, the children did not do significantly better on 
the control questions at Time 2, t (9) = -2.25, p = .051, Hedges‘ g = -0.68. Doing an analysis 
of covariance with the change in control scores as a covariate, there was still a significant 
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increase in ToM scores from Time 1 to Time 2, MT1 = 27.6, MT2 = 43.5, F (1,8) = 5.85, p = 
.042, partial η2 = .423. 
In summary, both the longitudinal study and the regression analysis showed severely 
delayed ToM skills in ASD compared to typical development (with the exception of the 
Asperger‘s syndrome group, who performed as well as the typically developing group). The 
results from the longitudinal investigation also support the results of the regression analysis in 
showing that ToM development can take place in ASD, and show that increases in ToM can 
occur in a relatively short space of time. No evidence of a plateau in ToM development was 
seen within the age range tested. Next, I will explore the different levels of ToM ability found 
within ASD more fully. 
Differences in ToM Ability between ASD and Typical Development 
ToM ability within the ASD groups was explored to examine the validity of the current 
DSM diagnostic categories and to see whether patterns of ToM ability emerged. The groups‘ 
scores for the early, basic, intermediate and advanced ToM modules are given in Table 8. As 
shown in the development section, the typically developing and Asperger‘s syndrome groups 
obtained the highest ToM scores, followed by the PDD-NOS group and then the low and 
high-functioning autism groups. This pattern was true for both the ToM and the control 
questions, though the groups seemed to perform somewhat better on the control questions 
than on the ToM questions. The PDD-NOS group had a large variation in ToM scores; much 
more so than any of the other groups had. From the scores it would seem that the Asperger‘s 
syndrome group performed better than the typically developing group. However, it should be 
kept in mind that the youngest participant in the typically developing group was 4 years old, 
and thus not expected to pass the intermediate and advanced ToM tasks. The youngest 
participant in the Asperger‘s syndrome group was 7 years old, at which age, in typical 
development, it is expected that the child should be able to pass the intermediate ToM tasks. 
The excellent performance of the Asperger‘s syndrome group is thus partly explained by the 
restricted age range in this group.
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Table 8. 
Theory of Mind Scores by Difficulty Level 
 LFA 
(n = 21) 
 
HFA 
(n = 24) 
 
AS 
(n = 21) 
 
PDD-NOS 
(n = 20) 
 
TD 
(n = 30) 
 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Early Control
a 
5.19 2.02 
 
6.25 2.27 
 
7.95 0.05 
 
7.20 1.51 
 
7.97 0.18 
Early ToM
a 
3.43 1.83 
 
5.04 2.03 
 
7.52 1.40 
 
6.05 2.21 
 
7.50 1.36 
Basic Control
b 
11.19 12.21 
 
21.24 10.67 
 
32.43 1.81 
 
27.90 4.97 
 
31.80 2.91 
Basic ToM
b 
6.67 8.06 
 
11.13 10.58 
 
29.81 3.64 
 
19.35 10.12 
 
30.73 5.30 
Intermediate Control
c 
1.62 7.42 
 
8.71 14.35 
 
39.33 5.34 
 
25.00 17.36 
 
33.33 10.68 
Intermediate ToM
c 
0.76 3.49 
 
5.92 9.97 
 
32.14 9.08 
 
16.90 12.89 
 
27.85 10.94 
Advanced Control
d 
- - 
 
4.25 14.40 
 
43.62 18.49 
 
21.80 24.88 
 
37.33 27.23 
Advanced ToM
d 
- - 
 
3.00 10.18 
 
33.33 15.11 
 
15.45 18.03 
 
28.63 18.61 
 
Note. In order to compare ToM and control scores, the Pretend and Sticker Hiding tasks, which did not have control questions, were 
left out of the Early and Basic modules, respectively. 
LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
a
 Maximum score = 8; 
b
 Maximum score = 33; 
c 
Maximum score = 33; 
d
 Maximum score = 56 
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 A one-way analysis of variance showed a significant difference in ToM ability between 
the groups, F (4,111) = 47.70, p < .0001, partial η2 = .632. Post hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
correction applied revealed significant differences between low-functioning autism and 
typical development (p < 0.001), high-functioning autism and typical development (p < 
0.001), and PDD-NOS and typical development (p = 0.001). There was no difference in ToM 
between the typically developing and Asperger‘s syndrome groups (p = 1.00). Within ASD, 
there were significant differences (all p < .01) in ToM ability between all the groups except 
between low-functioning autism and high-functioning autism (p = .194). Although there was 
no significant difference between the low and high-functioning autism groups, there was a 
trend towards children with high-functioning autism performing better on ToM than children 
with low-functioning autism (power = .788).   
 
Figure 3. Differences in theory of mind between typical development and the 
various autism spectrum disorder groups. As shown in the graph, the Asperger‘s 
syndrome group performed equivalently to the typically developing control group. ToM 
performance was increasingly poorer for PDD-NOS, high-functioning autism and low-
functioning autism.  
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Table 9.  
Differences Between the Groups in Total Theory of Mind Score 
 Group Significance 
 LFA HFA AS PDD-
NOS 
TD 
F (4, 111) p ESE 
n 21 24 21 20 30 
47.70 < .0001 .632 Mean 20.29 43.50 127.05 78.95 120.52 
SD 18.52 34.25 28.37 42.89 33.72 
Note. ESE = Effect size estimate partial η2, LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = high-
functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
 
Figure 3 and Table 9 reveal large standard deviations in ToM within most of the groups; 
this shows that there is considerable variation in ToM within the groups. As the large standard 
deviations found indicate that the diagnostic groups are not homogenous, a cluster analysis 
was done, using ToM skill as the classifier, to see whether the data clusters into five groups 
(roughly corresponding to low and high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS 
and typical development) or whether a different cluster structure fits the data best.  
K-means cluster analysis using Euclidean distances was used to identify groups within 
the data. Cluster analysis is merely descriptive and cannot prove the existence of groups as 
different solutions may be obtained with different methods; however, it can be an effect ive 
way to classify cases provided that fairly distinct categories naturally occur within the sample 
(Afifi & Virginia, 1990). First, I examined a five cluster solution, which would be expected if 
the four ASD subgroups and the typically developing group each had their own ToM profile. 
The result of the five cluster K-means solution is shown in Figure 4 below. Un
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Figure 4. Continuous variable distribution for the five cluster K-means analysis.
 The performance of the cluster on the different ToM tests is shown. 
  
The five cluster solution explained 34% of the variance in total ToM score. Although 
there were significant differences between the group centroids, this is can be misleading as K-
means specifically clusters cases so that groups are dissimilar. Clusters A and C and clusters 
D and E in Figure 4 seem very similar. Therefore, from the continuous variable plot shown in 
Figure 4 and from inspecting the cluster distributions of the ToM variables, it seems that a 
three cluster model may be better. A three cluster model also makes sense from the ANOVA 
results presented above: the Asperger‘s syndrome and typically developing groups did equally 
well and the PDD-NOS group did not perform in a uniform way, leaving roughly three 
groups: low-functioning autism, high-functioning autism/PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s 
syndrome/typical development/PDD-NOS. The results of the 3 cluster K-means solution is 
shown in Figure 5. Analysing the cluster distributions and the continuous variable plot, a three 
cluster solution seems reasonable. Again, there were significant differences between the 
cluster centroids on all the ToM tasks (all p < 0.0001). The three cluster solution explained 
44% of the variance in total ToM score. Three clusters also accounted for more of the 
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variance in ToM than two or four clusters (R
2
 = .43 and .37 respectively), and proved to be 
the most interpretable clinically. 
 
 
Figure 5. Continuous variable distribution for the three cluster K-means analysis. 
Three distinct clusters emerged. Participants in Cluster A did well on very easy, non-
verbal ToM tasks such as Pretend and Sticker Hiding, but poorly on most other ToM 
tasks. Participants in Cluster B did fairly well on the easy and basic modules, but 
performed poorly on more difficult ToM tasks. Participants in Cluster C performed well 
on all ToM tasks. 
 
The three cluster solution produces quite distinct groups. Participants in Cluster A do 
well on very easy, non-verbal ToM tasks such as Pretend and Sticker Hiding, but poorly on 
most other ToM tasks. Participants in Cluster B do fairly well on the easy and basic modules, 
but perform poorly on more difficult ToM tasks. Participants in Cluster C perform well on all 
ToM tasks. As shown in figures 6 and 7, the Unexpected-Contents and Location-Change false 
belief tests discriminated best between Cluster A and the other two clusters, and the Lies and 
Jokes and Faux Pas tests discriminated effectively between Clusters B and C.  
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Figure 6. The distribution of performances of the three clusters on the Location-
Change False Belief task. Cluster A performed poorly on the Location-Change False 
Belief task, Cluster C performed very well, and Cluster B performed midway between 
the other groups.  
 
 
Figure 7. The performance distribution of the clusters on the Lies and Jokes and 
Faux Pas tasks. Cluster C performed much better than Cluster B on both these tasks. 
No children from Cluster A proceeded to the Lies and Jokes and Faux Pas tasks. 
 
Table 10 compares the cases in the three clusters on demographic variables. Firstly, it 
can be observed that the standard deviations for the three clusters are all much smaller than 
those for the DSM-IV diagnostic groups: The largest standard deviation for the clusters was 
25.80, compared with the DSM-IV groups where the largest standard deviation was 42.89, 
and the smallest was 18.52. Notably, most typically developing children are in Cluster C. 
Children with Asperger‘s syndrome either fall within Cluster B or Cluster C, the two clusters 
associated with greater ToM performance. Children with low and high-functioning autism 
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were grouped in Clusters A and B, with Cluster A containing children with more severe 
impairments. The typically developing child in Cluster A was one of the youngest children in 
the sample and very withdrawn, which may explain his grouping with this cluster. The 
typically developing children in Cluster B were all 7 years of age or younger, were typically 
non-English first language speakers and of low or medium SES backgrounds. The fact that 
children with low and high-functioning autism are split between Clusters A and B indicates 
the often arbitrary nature of the division between low and high-functioning autism. While 
children on different ends of these groups are very different, children with an IQ score close 
to 70 (which forms the division between low and high-functioning autism) can be very 
similar. 
 
Table 10. 
The Three Groups Obtained from K-Means Cluster Analysis 
 Clusters Significance 
 A B C  F/ χ2 p 
N 36 29 49    
ToM 23.78 (15.78) 62.84 (25.80) 135.45 (14.27)  688.89 < .0001 
FSIQ 70.47 (11.72) 81.76 (14.49) 93.17 (14.69)  28.83 < .0001 
Age      11.33 < .0001 
 Mean (SD) 9.13 (2.94) 8.42 (2.86) 11.22 (2.54)    
 Range 4 - 16 4 - 16 5 - 16    
DSM Subtype     64.78 < .0001 
 LFA 16 (44%) 3 (10%) -    
 HFA 13 (36%) 9 (31%) 2 (4%)    
 AS - 3 (10%) 18 (37%)    
 PDD-NOS 6 (17%) 6 (21%) 8 (16%)    
 TD 1 (3%) 8 (28%) 21 (43%)    
School Type     48.24 < .0001 
 Autism specific 24 (67%) 14 (48%) 1 (2%)    
 Special Needs / 
 Home schooling 
 
11 (31%) 
 
7 (24%) 
 
21 (43%) 
   
 Mainstream 1 (3%)  8(28%) 27 (55%)   
Note. FSIQ = full scale IQ, SD = standard deviation, LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = 
high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
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The demographic information presented in Table 10 shows an association between 
ToM ability and the kind of school environment a child is currently in. Except for the young 
typically developing children, all children in Clusters A and B were in autism-specific or 
general special needs schools, with the majority of the children being in an autism-specific 
school (which mostly caters to children with more severe autism behaviours). In Cluster C, 
the ASD children were mostly in general special needs schools; in other words, schools that 
are more academically focused than the autism schools, but where classes are smaller and 
more structured. The rest of the ASD children in this cluster were in mainstream schools, with 
the exception of one child who was in an autism-specific school. 
 In summary, an ANOVA could distinguish between Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS 
and low and high-functioning autism (though the difference between the last two groups was 
not significant). However, the PDD-NOS group especially, but also the other ASD groups, 
had high standard deviations on the ToM scores, indicating a lack of homogeneity within the 
groups. The ANOVA could not distinguish Asperger‘s syndrome from typical development. 
A cluster analysis using Euclidean distances between ToM performance split the sample into 
three clusters corresponding to poor ToM performance (Cluster A), below average ToM 
performance (Cluster B) and normal ToM task performance (Cluster C).
1
 
 
The effect of cognitive functioning on ToM task performance. Different levels of 
ability between the groups, for example comprehension ability, general intellectual 
functioning or executive functioning, may confound group results. The groups were therefore 
compared on comprehension of ToM tasks and cognitive functioning and ANCOVAs were 
done to eliminate the effects of confounding variables. 
Comprehension of ToM tasks. To test whether the groups understood the instructions 
and were able to answer questions appropriately, one-way analyses of variance were done to 
compare the groups‘ scores on the control questions. Each battery had a similar number of 
control questions to ToM questions. As many children in the ASD group did not advance to 
the intermediate and advanced ToM modules, and therefore did not complete all those control 
questions, the groups‘ control scores on the separate modules (in which they had to complete 
every question), rather than their overall control score, were compared. As shown in Table 11, 
there were significant group differences in control scores on the early, basic and intermediate 
modules. Post hoc analyses with Bonferroni correction applied revealed that the low and 
                                               
1 This is not to say that social cognition is not impaired within this group, but rather that the children performed 
in the normal range on the set of ToM tasks administered.  
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high-functioning autism groups performed significantly more poorly than the typically 
developing groups on the early, basic, and intermediate modules‘ control questions (all p < 
.05). The PDD-NOS group also performed more poorly than the typically developing on the 
control questions of the basic module. 
 
Table 11. 
Differences Between the Groups in Control Scores on the Four Theory of Mind Modules 
 Significance Post hoc comparisons 
 F p ESE 
Early 14.74
a 
< .0001 .347  LFA, HFA <  AS, TD 
Basic 17.48
b 
< .0001 .419  LFA, HFA, PDD-NOS < AS, TD 
Intermediate 3.81
c 
.008 .188  HFA < PDD-NOS, AS, TD* 
Advanced 0.47
d 
 .708 .027  ns 
Note. ESE = Effect size estimate partial η2, LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = high-
functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
* The LFA group is not shown as there was only one participant who completed this module 
a
 df = 4,111; 
b
 df = 4,97; 
c
 df = 4,66; 
d
 df = 3,50  
 
Because of the PDD-NOS, low and high-functioning autism groups‘ poor performance 
on control questions, a series of planned comparisons, shown in Table 12, were done 
comparing the groups‘ performances on control and ToM tasks. As the largest group 
differences were found in the Early and Basic modules, these modules were chosen for 
comparison to keep the Type I error rate low and a Bonferroni correction was applied to the 
significance values.  
The planned comparisons revealed that these groups still performed significantly lower 
on the ToM questions than on the control questions (see Table 12). In contrast to this, there 
were no significant differences between the control and ToM scores for the typically 
developing group, who performed well on both sets of questions. We would expect this 
pattern of performance if the ASD groups had specific ToM deficits rather than, or over and 
above, more general deficits in language comprehension and expression.  
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Table 12. 
Comparison of Control and Theory of Mind Scores on the Early and Basic Modules 
 
  Test Type    
Group Module Control  ToM   Significance 
M SD  M SD  t p 
LFA Early  5.19 2.02  3.43 1.83  5.10 < .001* 
 Basic 11.19 12.21  6.67 8.06  3.01 .003* 
HFA Early  6.25 0.31  5.04 0.36  3.57 < .001* 
 Basic 21.13 1.61  11.13 1.67  7.66 < .001* 
PDD-NOS Basic 27.90 4.97  19.35 10.12  5.91 < .001* 
TD Early  7.97 0.27  7.50 0.33  1.57 .1118 
 Basic 31.80 1.44  30.73 1.50  0.90 .370 
Note. Group performances are only displayed for the modules on which the ASD groups 
performed significantly more poorly than the typically developing group. The Asperger‘s 
syndrome group is not included as this group performed similarly to the typically developing 
group on all the control tasks. 
 * Significant at α = .007 (Bonferroni correction) 
 
Differences in cognitive functioning. The results of the five one-way analyses of variance for 
cognitive functioning are shown in Table 13. Significant group differences were found in 
verbal IQ, verbal generativity, inhibition/set shifting, digit span and processing speed. The 
PDD-NOS and low and high-functioning autism groups performed more poorly than the 
typically developing group on verbal IQ, verbal generativity, digit span and processing speed 
(all p < .025). All the groups performed similarly to the typically developing group on the 
inhibition/set shifting task, except the low-functioning autism group who performed 
significantly more poorly on this task (p = .045). The Asperger‘s syndrome and the typically 
developing group performed equally well on all the tasks except for the processing speed task, 
on which the Asperger‘s syndrome group performed more poorly than the typically 
developing group (all p = .02). It is of course possible that the single significant result 
between these two groups could be an artefact, or due to chance. Overall, the typically 
developing and Asperger‘s syndrome groups performed the best, the autism groups performed 
the most poorly and the PDD-NOS group performed midway between the high-functioning 
autism and Asperger‘s syndrome groups. 
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Table 13.          
   
  
Group Performances on Measures of Cognitive Function 
 
    
  LFA   HFA   AS   PDD-NOS   TD   Significance Test  
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   F p ESE  
Verbal IQ 59.24 5.41  75.42 9.71  98.57 16.54  79.45 12.28  93.47 18.76  28.36
a 
< .001 .505  
Verbal 
Generativity 24.00 10.68  33.67 15.82  48.95 15.38  36.00 12.81  54.29 17.77  10.76
b 
< .001 .341 
 
Inhibition/ 
Set Shifting 133.00 76.54  118.27 37.76  103.05 32.17  117.73 38.16  86.26 28.82  2.72
c 
.035 .126 
 
Digit Span 2.79 2.46  5.11 2.58  7.86 2.50  5.31 3.26  7.79 2.06  12.12
d 
< .001 .353 
 
Processing 
Speed 5.33 3.92   8.10 4.51   12.81 4.65   10.00 4.71   17.33 4.97   19.85
e 
< .001 .466 
 
Note. Verbal Generativity represents the number of words generated for semantic and category fluency. The Inhibition/ Set Shifting score is the 
time taken to complete the Colour-Word Interference task. A high score indicates a poor performance. Digit Span is given as a scaled score with 
the typical population mean being 10. Processing Speed is given as a scaled score with the typical population mean being 20. 
LFA = low-functioning autism, HFA = high-functioning autism, AS = Asperger‘s syndrome, PDD-NOS = pervasive developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified, TD = typical development 
a 
df = 4,111; 
b
  df = 4, 83; 
c 
df = 4, 76; 
d
  df = 4, 89; 
e
  df = 4, 91 
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The cognitive variables measured were all significantly correlated with ToM score (p < 
.001), as shown in Table 14, and thus an analysis of covariance was performed to confirm that 
differences in ToM score between the groups were not due to any confounding factors. 77 
participants were used for this analysis, as 39 participants were either below 6 years and did 
not do all the tasks, or could not complete some of the tasks. In the latter case, discontinuation 
was due to two main reasons: inability to read, which excluded these participants from the 
Colour-Word Interference task, and lack of knowledge of the alphabet or numbers, which 
excluded them from the Verbal Fluency task.  
 
Table 14.  
Correlation Matrix of Theory of Mind and Measures of Cognitive Function 
  ToM  
Processing 
Speed 
Digit 
Span 
Inhibition/  
Set shifting  
Verbal 
Generativit
y VIQ 
ToM  -- 0.621*** 0.577*** -0.388*** 0.657*** 0.68*** 
Processing Speed    -- 0.494*** -0.313** 0.52*** 0.613*** 
Digit Span      -- -0.235* 0.429*** 0.57*** 
Inhibition/Set 
shifting 
       -- -0.303** -0.239* 
Verbal 
Generativity 
         -- 0.613*** 
VIQ            -- 
Note. ToM = theory of mind, VIQ = verbal IQ 
* p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The analysis of covariance showed that, even after controlling for cognitive functions 
associated with ToM performance, there remained a significant difference in ToM between 
the groups, F (4, 67) = 10.08, p < .0001, partial η2 = .376. The estimated ToM scores, had 
VIQ, generativity, inhibition, working memory and processing speed been similar amongst 
the groups, are given in Table 15. 
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Figure 8. Estimated average ToM scores after controlling for verbal IQ, 
generativity, inhibition, working memory and processing speed. When the afore-
mentioned cognitive factors are statistically controlled for, the low and high-functioning 
groups perform equally. A significant difference remains between these groups and the 
Asperger‘s syndrome and typically developing groups. PDD-NOS performance 
increases, but remains poorer than the typically developing and Asperger‘s syndrome 
groups. Note: Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Verbal IQ = 84.62, Verbal Generativity = 43.51, Inhibition/Set Shifting = 108.05, Digit 
Span = 6.40, Processing Speed = 11.43. Error bars indicate standard error scores. 
 
Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that significant differences 
remained between all the ASD groups and the typically developing group (all p ≤ .003), with 
the exception of the Asperger‘s syndrome group. Again, the Asperger‘s syndrome and the 
typically developing groups did the best on ToM, followed by the PDD-NOS group, and then 
the low and high-functioning autism groups. 
To summarise, I hypothesized that the Asperger‘s syndrome and high-functioning 
autism groups would do equally well on measures of ToM; doing better than the low-
functioning autism group, but more poorly than the typically developing group. This 
hypothesis was only partly upheld: both before and after controlling for confounding 
cognitive factors such as IQ, the high-functioning autism group did better than the low-
functioning autism group but more poorly than the typically developing group. However, a 
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large difference between the performance of the Asperger‘s syndrome group and the high-
functioning group emerged; in fact, the Asperger‘s syndrome group performed as well on 
tests of ToM as the typically developing group did. The PDD-NOS group displayed a 
heterogeneous performance, with average ToM scores between that of the high-functioning 
autism group and the Asperger‘s syndrome group. This is illustrated in the results of the 
cluster analysis, which cluster the sample into a mostly low-functioning group, a mostly high-
functioning group, and a group consisting mostly of Asperger‘s syndrome and typically 
developing children. Cases from the PDD-NOS group form part of each of the three clusters.  
Investigating Diagnostic Criteria: Language Delays and Asperger's Syndrome 
To investigate the large differences found between the Asperger‘s syndrome and high-
functioning autism groups, the diagnoses of the participants with Asperger‘s syndrome were 
examined. As discussed in the Methods section, the diagnoses of the ASD participants were 
made by clinicians independent of this study and were used for this study as given. However, 
when I interviewed parents about these children's early language development, I found that 11 
of the 21 children had language delays; defined as no single words at 2 years and phrase 
speech only after 3 years of age. Therefore, according to the DSM-IV, these children should 
in fact be diagnosed with high-functioning autism. One of the language delayed participants 
also had an IQ score in the mildly intellectually disabled range although the DSM-IV 
specifies that intellectual functioning should be average or above average in Asperger‘s 
syndrome (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
The Speech Delay and No Speech Delay Asperger‘s syndrome groups were compared 
on ToM and measures of cognitive function and the results are displayed in Table 16.  
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Table 15. 
Performance of the Speech Delay and No Speech Delay Asperger’s Syndrome 
Groups on Cognitive Measures 
  No Speech Delay   Speech Delay     Significance Test 
  Mean SD   Mean SD     t p ESE 
Age 11.02 2.76  11.59 2.22   -0.54 .600 -0.22 
ToM 124.82 32.26  124.77 28.34   0.004 .997 0.00 
FSIQ 101.80 12.17  97.18 14.92   0.58 .570 0.32 
VIQ 99.09 17.98  95.64 16.87   0.47
 
.647 0.19 
Verbal 
Generativity 46.82 16.53  50.09 14.34   -0.50
 
.625 -0.20 
Inhibition/ 
Set Shifting 108.73 41.40  95.27 17.52   0.99
 
.338 0.41 
Digit Span 8.73 2.53  7.09 2.17   1.63
 
.119 0.67 
Processing 
Speed 14.82 4.09  11.18 4.58   1.96 .064 0.80 
Note. 11 Children with Asperger‘s syndrome formed part of the Speech Delay group and 10 
formed part of the No Speech Delay group. ESE = effect size estimate, Hodge‘s g, ToM = 
theory of mind, FSIQ = full scale IQ, VIQ = verbal IQ 
 
There were no differences between the Speech Delay and No Speech Delay groups in 
ToM score. Neither were there any differences in age, verbal IQ, inhibition, generativity, 
working memory or processing speed. Figure 8 illustrates how similar the two groups were on 
the ToM measures. 
 
 
Figure 9. The ToM performance of the Speech Delay and No Speech Delay groups. 
The error bars denote the 95% confidence intervals. 
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In light of the disputable diagnosis of 11 participants in the Asperger‘s syndrome group, 
the ToM group comparison was repeated, this time with the 11 Speech Delay ‗Asperger‘s 
Syndrome‘ participants as part of the high-functioning autism group. Rerunning the analysis 
of covariance with ToM as the dependent variable, Group as the independent variable (nLFA = 
21, nHFA = 35, nAS = 10, nPDD-NOS = 20, nTD = 30) and verbal IQ, verbal generativity, 
inhibition/ set shifting, digit span and processing speed as covariates, there was still a 
significant difference between the groups on ToM, F (4,68) = 3.29, p = .016, partial η2 = .16; 
however there was no longer a significant difference between high-functioning autism and 
Asperger‘s syndrome (p = .550). 
In conclusion, distinctive levels of ToM ability did emerge within ASD, but these 
clusters did not correspond to the current DSM diagnostic criteria. PDD-NOS was particularly 
problematic in that it did not display a homogenous profile or fit within any specific cluster. 
The large differences in ToM ability, particularly between autism and Asperger‘s syndrome, 
do not support a singular autistic disorder category. Although the differences between high-
functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome were no longer significant after children with 
language delays were removed from the Asperger‘s group and included in the high-
functioning autism group, the cluster analysis still showed large difference in ToM between 
higher-functioning ASD children.  In light of the fact that the Speech Delay Asperger‘s 
syndrome group performed equivalently to the No Speech Delay Asperger‘s syndrome group 
and very differently from children with high-functioning autism, their inclusion within the 
Asperger‘s syndrome group seems valid. Only two children in the high-functioning autism 
group performed similarly to most of the children with Asperger‘s syndrome, as can be seen 
from the cluster analysis results. The difference in school placement and diagnosis between 
the clusters suggests that ToM can be used to predict adaptive functioning in children with 
ASD. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
e T
ow
n
68 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of the study was to see whether differences in ToM ability and its development 
would be present in ASD, with the final goal of being able to split the proposed singular 
DSM-V autistic disorder category into different levels of functioning. With this aim in mind, 
the development versus stability of ToM in ASD will first be discussed. Differences in ToM 
between ASD subgroups, both DSM-defined and those identified by cluster analysis, will be 
discussed next. Lastly, recommendations will be given with regard to diagnostic problems 
within ASD. 
Summary and Implications of Results 
ToM development or stability? I investigated whether ToM development is delayed or 
deviant in ASD. The deviant development hypothesis predicts that ToM never reaches the 
level seen in typical development, or that ToM develops in a different sequence to that seen in 
typical development. The specific developmental delay hypothesis predicts that ToM 
development does occur in ASD, albeit more slowly. Thus the same skills should be seen in 
ASD as in typical development, though these skills may only be displayed much later in the 
lifespan than in typically developing individuals. 
The performance of the high-functioning autism, PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome 
groups are consistent with the delayed development hypothesis. All the ASD groups except 
for the Asperger‘s syndrome group showed delayed onset of ToM skills at 4 years old, with 
most children not passing age-appropriate false belief tasks at this age. However, comparison 
of the regression analyses revealed significantly better ToM skills with increasing age in the 
high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS groups. There was furthermore 
no difference in the rate of ToM development between these groups and the typically 
developing group. Neither does the task performance of these ASD groups suggest a deviant 
pattern of ToM skill acquisition. There were no large differences between higher-functioning 
ASD (high-functioning autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS) and typical 
development in the order in which tasks were passed. There was also no evidence of a plateau 
in the development of ToM skills. In summary, the higher functioning ASD groups showed a 
delayed onset in ToM skills, but a normal rate and sequence of development, as predicted by 
the delayed development hypothesis. 
However, there was a disparity between the performance of the higher-functioning ASD 
groups and that of the low-functioning autism group. ToM in low-functioning autism seems 
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better explained by the deviant development account. In this group, ToM performance did not 
increase with increasing age. It therefore seems that ToM might develop in higher functioning 
ASD, but not in ASD with concurrent intellectual disability.   
The improvement in ToM skills seen in the 10 children who were reassessed after 1 
year also supports the hypothesized delayed development in high-functioning autism. 
Although these children were extremely deficient in ToM skills (with most children not 
passing first-order false belief tasks, despite the average age being 8 years) some increases in 
ToM were observed at the follow-up assessment. Specifically, on the early ToM module, five 
children passed the Desire task at Time 2, whereas before none of the 10 had passed it, and 
three children passed the Perception-Knowledge task who had not done so previously. On the 
basic module, four children passed the Location-Change False Belief task at Time 2, whereas 
none had passed it at Time 1. With the exception of the performances of one child on the 
Perception-Knowledge task and two on the Explanation of Action task, if a child passed a task 
at Time 1, he or she also passed the task at Time 2. This suggests that those who passed 
genuinely understood the tasks, and therefore that genuine improvement in ToM was 
observed. 
Regarding the inconsistent performance of some children on the ToM tasks, the fact that 
one boy performed worse on the Perception-Knowledge task at follow-up may be because this 
task consisted of yes/no answers. It is possible that he merely passed by chance during the 
first assessment. It is unclear why two children failed the Explanation of Action task who had 
passed it before. It may be that these children can sometimes use mental state reasoning 
effectively, but cannot do so consistently or when not concentrating on the task at hand. 
Another possible explanation is a loss of ToM skills. However, as these three children did 
similarly or better on other ToM tasks at Time 2, there is no reason to suspect loss of skills in 
this sample. Therefore, both the regression analysis and the follow-up study suggest 
development of ToM skills with age in higher-functioning ASD. 
In summary, the research results support the delayed development hypothesis for certain 
ASD subgroups; specifically, high-functioning autism, PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome. 
These groups displayed a normal rate and sequence of ToM development, though the onset of 
ToM abilities was delayed. Similar to the results of the current study, Steele et al. (2003) and 
Paynter and Peterson (2009) found that ToM did increase in ASD, and Sparrevohn and Howie 
(1995) concurred that a normal sequence of ToM development is present in ASD.  
In contrast to these results, the longitudinal studies by Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994)  and 
Holroyd and Baron-Cohen (1993) have failed to find ToM development in autism. In the case 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
70 
 
 
of Holroyd and Baron-Cohen, ToM was reassessed after 7 years, a much longer time span 
than the 1 year follow-up presented here. The conflicting results between studies might be 
explained by examining the ASD population represented in a study. For example, Holroyd 
and Baron-Cohen used a sample of predominantly low-functioning children. If you compare 
the performance of the low-functioning group from the current study with that of Holroyd and 
Baron-Cohen‘s sample, the results agree: ToM performance did not increase with increasing 
age. It therefore seems that ToM might develop in higher functioning ASD, but not in ASD 
with concurrent intellectual disability, which explains the disparate research results. Another 
explanation for the conflicting results between studies is that the current study, like that of 
Steele et al. (2003), used younger children and measured earlier developing ToM skills than 
those assessed by Holroyd and Baron-Cohen and Ozonoff and McEvoy, which made it 
possible to identify pre-false belief ToM development in certain ASD groups.  
In conclusion, a distinction was seen between ToM performance in low-functioning 
autism and higher-functioning ASD. Delayed development of ToM was observed in high-
functioning autism, PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome. In contrast, ToM did not seem to 
improve in low-functioning autism, supporting the deviance model of development in this 
group. The differences observed between ASD groups may explain previous contradictory 
research results. 
Age of development of false belief reasoning in ASD. As false belief reasoning has 
traditionally been the principal test of ToM, its onset within the current ASD sample was 
investigated. In his paper on specific ToM delays in autism, Baron-Cohen (1989) reported 
that the youngest age at which children in his sample passed first-order false belief tasks was 
11 years. Happé (1995) suggested that individuals with autism require at least a verbal mental 
age of 9 years 2 months in order to pass false belief tasks. Though mental age was not 
calculated for this sample, these chronological and mental age estimates are similar to the 
youngest chronological age that was needed for children with autism and PDD-NOS to pass 
false belief tasks in this sample: While the majority of typically developing 4-6 years olds and 
all typically developing children 7 years and older passed first-order false belief tasks, the 
average age at which children with autism passed both of the first-order false belief tasks was 
13.5 years. The youngest child with autism to pass both first-order false belief tasks was 10 
years old; the youngest child with PDD-NOS to pass was 8 years old. Of all the ASD children 
who passed, only two had IQs in the mild intellectual disability range (notably, one of these 
boys was diagnosed as having Asperger‘s syndrome rather than autism). These results 
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therefore agree with Happé‘s suggestion that a certain level of cognitive functioning or 
language ability is necessary to pass false belief tasks.  
Asperger’s syndrome: Intrinsic or extrinsic ToM? The Asperger‘s syndrome group 
was the only ASD group to show no impairments in ToM: Although there was a difference in 
ToM onset between the high-functioning autism and PDD-NOS groups and typical 
development, there was no difference in onset of ToM between Asperger‘s syndrome and 
typical development. These results need to be interpreted with caution, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the youngest participant with Asperger‘s syndrome was 7 years old. The reason for 
the narrower age range in the Asperger‘s syndrome group is that many children with 
Asperger‘s syndrome are only diagnosed at around 6 or 7 years because they show less severe 
behavioural and communication problems than children with autism (Rosenberg et al., 2009). 
This meant that all the Asperger‘s syndrome participants in this study could pass at least first-
order false belief tasks, so that the onset of ToM abilities, as tested by the battery, had to be 
extrapolated for this group.  
Secondly, although there were no significant differences in ToM found between 
Asperger‘s syndrome and typical development, this does not mean that children with 
Asperger‘s syndrome have normal social skills. These children‘s parents reported problems 
with making friends, turn taking in conversation, understanding non-literal speech, and other 
problems related to deficits in ToM. From these reports it is unclear whether greater ToM test 
results are due to improved intrinsic, or true, ToM skills, or due to improved compensatory 
skills.  
The fact that the low-functioning autism group showed no increase in ToM with age, 
and many higher-functioning ASD children showed excellent ToM task performance while 
still struggling with real-life social situations, suggests that compensatory skills play a role in 
the observed increases in ToM. Unlike the other ASD groups who participated in the study, 
the low-functioning autism group does not have the cognitive capacity to understand what is 
required from the tests, and therefore may not be able to compensate for their diminished 
intrinsic ToM by reasoning out the correct answer. Frith et al. (1994) demonstrated that there 
may be an ASD subgroup who use compensatory skills to pass ToM tasks, but struggle with 
real life social situations, and an ASD group in which ToM skills truly are more developed. 
Thus, although ToM impairments in Asperger‘s syndrome are certainly of a lesser nature than 
those seen in autism, these children may not be as socially competent as their ToM results 
would suggest. This also applies to older ASD children whose ToM scores may be higher 
than they were in early childhood. Clearly, the ToM tests currently used do not measure all 
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aspects of ToM, and are not good simulations of natural social scenes. These tests may be 
sufficient to detect severe ToM deficits, but are not sensitive enough for children with mild 
ToM impairments, as is likely to be the case in Asperger‘s syndrome.  
 
In conclusion, the results support a delayed development hypothesis for high-
functioning autism, PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome. ToM does develop in these ASD 
groups, but the onset of ToM is much later than in typical development. The low-functioning 
group was the only group to perform as predicted by the deviant development hypothesis; the 
other groups showed a normal rate and sequence of development, with no plateaus in ToM 
development. The fact that the low-functioning autism group showed no increases in ToM 
suggests that certain language and cognitive skills may be necessary for ToM development, or 
that compensatory skills are the cause of the observed increases in ToM performance in the 
other ASD groups. Though compensatory skills may help on pencil-and-paper tasks and basic 
interactions, they may not be enough for effective social understanding, as was demonstrated 
by parents‘ reports of relatively poor social skills in children with Asperger‘s syndrome (with 
high ToM scores) in comparison with typically developing children. Thus, though ToM may 
improve with age, this does not mean that older children with ASD no longer have social and 
communicative impairments. This improvement in ToM is also not universal in ASD, as is 
evident from the performance of the low-functioning autism group. 
 
Differences in ToM ability between the ASD subgroups. One of the study‘s aims was 
to establish whether ASD children could be differentiated into distinct groups of ToM ability 
independent of their general cognitive and executive functioning ability. If no distinct clusters 
of ToM ability emerged, the results would support the proposed singular autistic disorder 
category. If clusters similar to the DSM-IV diagnostic categories emerged, this would argue 
against removing these subgroups from the DSM. If clusters of ToM appeared that did not 
correspond to the DSM-IV diagnostic categories, this would indicate that a new classification 
system might be helpful. 
When I compared the DSM-IV diagnostic categories, I found large differences in ToM 
performance between the ASD groups, even after differences in verbal IQ, verbal 
generativity, inhibition/set shifting, working memory and processing speed were statistically 
factored out. On average, children with high-functioning autism passed early ToM tasks such 
as pretend play and understanding desire, but failed to understand first-order false belief tasks. 
Children with low-functioning autism did not, on average, show pretend play or understand 
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others' desires. Children diagnosed with PDD-NOS performed significantly better on the ToM 
tasks than children diagnosed with autism, but worse than children with Asperger‘s syndrome, 
who performed similarly to typically developing children. It is interesting that children with 
PDD-NOS did better on the ToM tasks than children with high-functioning autism despite the 
fact that these groups‘ verbal IQ scores (which are highly correlated with ToM performance) 
were equivalent. This finding agrees with Baron-Cohen‘s (1989) viewpoint that even though 
higher verbal IQ scores are correlated with higher ToM scores, a high verbal IQ is not 
sufficient to pass ToM tasks.  
Results from previous studies have shown that children with PDD-NOS may have better 
(Begeer et al., 2003) or worse (Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stockmann, 2000) ToM skills 
than children with autism; these divergent results highlight the heterogeneity found in PDD-
NOS. In this study too, some children with PDD-NOS performed similarly to children with 
low or high-functioning autism on ToM tasks, while others showed a much better 
performance, similar to that seen in Asperger‘s syndrome. Given that a goal of diagnosis is to 
describe a similar set of conditions, these results call into question the use of having a 
category such as PDD-NOS. This idea will be explored further in the discussion on the results 
of the cluster analysis. 
Contrary to many previous research results, large differences emerged between the 
high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome groups, even after controlling for cognitive 
factors that could influence participants' performance on the ToM tasks. This finding concurs 
with that of four previous studies comparing high-functioning autism and Asperger's 
syndrome (Kuroda et al., 2011; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Paynter & Peterson, 2009; Ziatas et al., 
1998). The reason that Klin (2000) and Spek et al. (2009) did not find differences between 
these groups may be that their participants were much older than those in the current sample. 
It is thus possible that their high-functioning autism participants may have ―caught up‖ with 
their Asperger‘s syndrome participants. It could also be argued that these studies used such 
difficult tests that both the Asperger‘s syndrome and high-functioning autism groups did 
badly on the tasks. Certainly, in the case of Klin‘s (2000) study, the Asperger‘s syndrome 
group provided more elaborate answers than the high-functioning autism group, but still 
performed more poorly than the typically developing group because of irrelevant responses. 
However, this argument would not hold for Spek et al. (2009) and Dahlgren and 
Trillingsgaard (1996), who mostly used similar tests to those used in this study, namely, first 
and second-order false belief, Strange Stories and Faux Pas. A more likely explanation is that 
studies have found different results because different diagnostic criteria were used to define 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
74 
 
 
Asperger‘s syndrome and high-functioning autism. For example, Ozonoff and colleagues 
(1991) classified children with previous language delays as part of the Asperger‘s syndrome 
group if they did not have any current language impairments. Indeed, in the current study it 
was found that 11 of the children diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome in fact had a history of 
language delays (though their language was not currently impaired). When these children 
were placed in the high-functioning autism group, the distinction between high functioning 
autism and Asperger's syndrome disappeared. It therefore seems that the reason for the 
contradictory results is not different methodologies, but different criteria for diagnosis.  
Reviewing the results thus far in terms of evaluating both the current and proposed 
DSM diagnostic criteria, several problems are evident. Firstly, the PDD-NOS group did not 
have a uniform profile for ToM or general cognitive abilities. Secondly, this study shows that 
Asperger‘s syndrome is not always diagnosed strictly according to DSM-IV criteria and 
depending on how the diagnosis of Asperger‘s syndrome was made, research results may 
differ considerably. In this study there were clearly two different groups; the vast majority of 
children in the higher ToM group were diagnosed with Asperger‘s syndrome. However, half 
of those diagnosed as Asperger‘s syndrome had early language delays. In strict accordance 
with the DSM-IV, these children should not have received a diagnosis of Asperger‘s 
syndrome. Hence, a different study may classify these children as high-functioning autism, 
resulting in better ToM performance in this group, and obscuring the two phenotype clusters 
found in my study. Thus, studies may get different results depending on how their participants 
are diagnosed.  
Considering that the language delayed and non-delayed Asperger‘s syndrome groups 
were strikingly similar (these groups performed equally well on both ToM and general 
cognitive functioning tasks) it is my opinion that early language development is not a good 
criterion on which to base diagnosis. Other researchers have come to similar conclusions 
regarding early language history. Prior et al. (1998) found different clusters of ASD on the 
basis of ToM skills and verbal ability, with cluster A being more autism-like and clusters B 
and C more like Asperger's syndrome and PDD-NOS. Critically, early language development 
was not associated with any specific cluster. Similarly, Howlin (2003) and Eisenmajer et al. 
(1998) also found that language delays do not predict symptomatology or social outcome in 
older individuals with higher-functioning ASD. If early language delay cannot predict 
differences in cognitive or behavioural outcomes, then it may not be a valid or reliable 
criterion for separating groups. 
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With these problems with the diagnostic criteria in mind, a cluster analysis was done 
to examine ToM differences within ASD by means of grouping similar cases together rather 
than comparing existing diagnostic categories. Previous cluster analyses have used 
intellectual functioning, type and severity of symptoms, and social behaviour to identify 
subgroups within ASD (see Willemsen-Swinkels & Buitelaar, 2002, for a summary). 
However, to my knowledge this was the first study to use ToM to cluster cases. I suggest it 
might be better to cluster ASD groups on what is suspected to be a primary cause of the 
symptoms and social behaviours in ASD, rather than clustering individuals on those more 
distal factors.  
Previous cluster analyses have found from two to four ASD subclassifications, ranging 
from mild/atypical to severe ASD (Castelloe & Dawson, 1993; Prior et al., 1998; Sevin et al., 
1995; Siegel, Anders, Ciaranello, Bienenstock, & Kraemer, 1986; Stevens et al., 2000). The 
cluster analysis in this study produced three well-differentiated ToM groups. These groups 
were roughly associated with current DSM diagnosis but not directly related to it. For 
instance, participants in Cluster A did well on very easy, non-verbal ToM tasks such as 
Pretend Play and Sticker Hiding, but poorly on most other ToM tasks. These participants were 
mostly diagnosed with autism, both low and high-functioning. No Asperger‘s syndrome 
participants fell into this group and the PDD-NOS participants who were part of this group 
were either very young (under 6 years old) or had severe autistic symptoms. Cluster B was 
mostly made up of high-functioning autism and PDD-NOS participants. The rest of Cluster B 
consisted of the highest functioning children of the low-functioning autism group and the 
lowest-functioning children with Asperger‘s syndrome, as well as the youngest typically 
developing children in the sample. Participants in this cluster did fairly well on the easy and 
basic ToM modules, but performed poorly on more difficult ToM tasks. Participants in 
Cluster C performed well on all ToM tasks. This cluster consisted mostly of typically 
developing children and children with Asperger‘s syndrome, as well as a few children with 
PDD-NOS. Only two children with autism (both high-functioning) formed part of this cluster.  
The cluster analysis provides a strong argument for classifying children on a 
dimensional rating scale based on ToM performance, for several reasons. Firstly, the cluster 
analysis produced groups that were much more homogenous on ToM ability than were the 
groups based on DSM-IV classification. Secondly, better ToM task performance seems to be 
strongly correlated with decreased severity of symptoms (as has also been found in Joseph & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2004; and Lerner et al., 2010). Though this study did not aim to explore the 
correlation between ToM and symptom severity, a negative relationship is suggested by 
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examining the frequency of the diagnostic categories within the clusters. Children with 
autism, who have the most severe symptomatology of the ASDs, were mostly placed in the 
most severely impaired cluster. This cluster was associated with the lowest IQ scores, but did 
not only contain children with intellectual disability. The cluster analysis also placed the 
Asperger‘s syndrome children, as well as children with language delays but with currently 
strong cognitive capabilities, both generally and in terms of ToM, in the highest ToM ability 
cluster. Furthermore, it refined the PDD-NOS diagnosis by splitting these children into the 
three clusters based on their degree of impairment.  
Thirdly, and related to symptom severity, the clusters were strongly associated with 
adaptive functioning, which can be inferred from the type of school environment in which the 
child is able to be placed. Children in Cluster C, the highest ToM cluster, were mostly in 
mainstream or general special needs schools. The general special needs schools are 
characterised by smaller classes than mainstream, but larger classes than autism-specific 
schools. These schools also have a more academic focus than autism-specific schools. The 
majority of the children in Clusters A and B were in autism-specific schools, and none of the 
ASD children in these clusters were in mainstream schools. One limitation is that, because of 
the sampling method used, this sample was biased towards children in autism-specific 
schools. However, the findings suggest that classifying children according to ToM ability 
could be of use to the educational system in deciding to which environment a child would be 
best suited.  
In summary, differences in ToM within ASD were examined in two ways: (1) by 
comparing DSM-IV diagnostic groups and (2) by comparing groups with similar ToM skills, 
as identified by a cluster analysis. Comparing DSM-IV subgroups revealed that the 
Asperger‘s syndrome group performed similarly to typically developing children in the study, 
the autism groups displayed the most impaired ToM skills, and the PDD-NOS performed 
midway between these groups. The heterogeneity of the PDD-NOS group and irregular 
diagnoses of the high-functioning autism/Asperger‘s syndrome participants support the DSM 
committee‘s decision to abandon the current diagnostic categories.  
The cluster analysis identified clusters somewhat different to the DSM-IV diagnostic 
groups. Three groups were identified: poor ToM performance (Cluster A), which consisted 
mostly of typical autism, below average ToM performance (Cluster B), which consisted 
mostly of high-functioning autism and PDD-NOS, and normal ToM task performance 
(Cluster C), which consisted mostly of Asperger‘s syndrome and typical development. Thus, 
despite supporting the DSM decision to change the current diagnostic criteria, the results 
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caution against using a single autistic disorder category, as large differences in ToM were 
found on both an ANOVA and a cluster analysis. It is therefore of practical importance to 
separate the groups, as these differences should reflect differences in the core ASD aspects of 
social and communicative functioning, which in turn affect outcome. 
Recommendations  
Investigating social competence. As discussed previously, current ToM tests may not 
be good simulations of social situations and may therefore be too easy for children with 
relatively well-developed ToM skills. One area of ToM research that critically needs attention 
is the development of more ecologically valid tasks to assess ToM, or more generally, 
empathy and social skills. There are two ways to go about this: develop increasingly complex 
tasks that mimic social situations, such as the ‗empathic accuracy‘ tests devised by Ickes 
(Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & De Corte, 2005; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van 
Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001) or test social inference when 
the participant's attention is divided between tasks. The second option is to assess more basic 
impairments in empathy, such as eye contact and social reciprocity, and to assess responses to 
social situations at a physiological rather than a cognitive level. If autism is indeed at its core 
a social impairment, all children with ASD should do poorly on such tasks, regardless of their 
performance on current 'advanced' ToM tests. Another benefit of the latter approach is that 
this does not exclude children who are non-verbal or intellectually disabled. Another area of 
study should be behaviours in autism that have no counterpart in normal development, such as 
obliviousness to parents or caretakers (VanMeter, Fein, Morris, Waterhouse, & Allen, 1997). 
Many of these behaviours have not been studied as comprehensively as traditional ToM skills, 
but play a critical role in the empathic deficits seen in autism.  
 
Diagnosis. Several problems with the current diagnostic criteria emerged. Firstly, my 
results emphasize that the category PDD-NOS is too heterogeneous to be of much use. 
Currently, it merely serves as a wastebasket for any atypical cases and is therefore not useful 
as an indicator of the severity of symptoms, what type of intervention may be needed, or of 
prognosis. PDD-NOS as a ―lesser variant of autism‖ (Matson & Boisjoli, 2007; Serra et al., 
2002) may be true for some of the cases that fall in this category, but individual cases may 
present with severe intellectual disability or symptomatology. Secondly, this study found no 
differences in ToM or general cognitive functioning based on early language development. 
Possibly because of this, I found that clinicians do not diagnose Asperger‘s syndrome strictly 
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according to the criterion of normal language development. Clearly, if diagnoses are made 
subjectively rather than according to recognised international standards, this can cause some 
confusion among researchers, clinicians and the general public.  
From these results, different courses of action are immediately evident: (1) change the 
diagnostic criteria for Asperger‘s syndrome so that they do not require the absence of 
language delays and create different categories within PDD-NOS, or (2) abandon the 
diagnostic categories of Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS and create a singular autistic 
disorder category. 
Regarding to the first strategy, PDD-NOS may be split into several clusters within 
which presentation is similar, as has been proposed by Walker et al. (2004). Asperger‘s 
syndrome could be diagnosed according to present day language and ToM skills, rather than 
early language development. This change in diagnostic criteria seems feasible given the lack 
of evidence for a correlation between previous language delays and current functioning. 
Indeed, though recent opinion holds that a diagnosis of Asperger‘s syndrome is impossible if 
language development is delayed (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) this was not 
always the prevailing opinion. Many researchers have held the opinion that Asperger‘s 
syndrome can be diagnosed in cases with a history of language delay as long as current 
language ability is at an age-appropriate level (Cederlund & Gillberg, 2007; Tantam, 1988; 
Wing, 1981), and that children who displayed autism-like symptoms in early childhood could 
develop language and social skills to the extent that they appeared more Asperger-like. With 
an increasing number of children throughout the world who have access to early, intensive 
intervention strategies, this may be occurring more and more frequently. 
A problem with maintaining separate diagnostic categories within ASD is that we do 
not know whether autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS have separate aetiologies. 
However, as Szatmari and colleagues argue, ―if the distinctiveness of disorders depends on 
demonstrating separate aetiologies, then there are few disorders in child psychology that 
could be truly separate‖ (Szatmari, Archer, Fisman, Streiner, & Wilson, 1995, p. 1670). 
Practically, the ability to identify groups with different levels of cognitive and behavioural 
functioning is clinically more useful. Such differences between high-functioning-autism, 
PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome were shown in the current study. 
A larger obstacle to retaining separate diagnoses for Asperger‘s syndrome, autism and 
PDD-NOS, is access to service provision and resources. If diagnosis is linked to symptom 
severity, this causes difficulty for clinical trials and access to medical aid. For example, the 
US‘ Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will not approve a drug‘s use for PDD-NOS if the 
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drug is approved for autism, even though the same children may have the two different 
diagnoses at different ages (Swedo et al., 2008). In certain states in the US, medical aid will 
pay for therapy for children with autism, but not for children with PDD-NOS (Lord, 2010). In 
light of such problems, one diagnosis for all children showing the triad of social and 
communicative deficits and repetitive behaviours would be favourable. 
The DSM-V planning committee has proposed that autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and 
PDD-NOS should be grouped into a single category in the DSM-V. However, the results of 
this study show that large differences in ToM exist within ASD. I would like to suggest that a 
singular ASD category would suffer from the same problems that are currently associated 
with PDD-NOS; namely that the range of symptom severities is too big for the diagnostic 
category to be of any practical use. This would in all likelihood mean that teachers, clinicians 
and researchers would revert to the old diagnostic names to explain a child‘s ‗autism 
phenotype‘, with the resulting classification problems that go along with those diagnoses.  
To counter such problems, it has been proposed that a dimensional classification system 
be created within DSM-V autistic disorder. The rating system currently proposed was shown 
in Table 1 (p. 15) and rates severity of autistic symptoms within two areas: social-
communication skills and presence of fixed interests and repetitive behaviours.  This 
approach was taken as several researchers are now of the opinion that ASD is 
multidimensional and that the core areas in ASD (socialization, communication and repetitive 
and restricted behaviours) may be separately affected and thus unevenly impaired (for 
instance, diagnosis may be complicated if a great deal of restricted and repetitive behaviours 
are present, but social-communicative skills are very good; Happé & Ronald, 2008; Swedo et 
al., 2008). Lord, Leventhal and Cook (2001) have suggested that ASD diagnosis should 
include even more dimensions. These authors suggested that classification should include 
nonverbal intellectual ability, expressive language, and social-emotional reciprocity with 
repetitive behaviours/restricted interests. However, assessment of severity may become 
unduly complicated when many domains have to be rated.  As has been previously discussed, 
the proposed dimensional categories for the DSM-V are currently only vaguely defined and 
are therefore vulnerable to misinterpretation or irregular application. 
However, a multidimensional classification system may not be necessary. There is some 
suggestion that intellectual functioning, social cognition and repetitive behaviours covary. 
Children with high IQs tend to be more socially active and have obsessive interests and 
rituals, whereas severely intellectually disabled children tend to be the most socially 
withdrawn and show more repetitive behaviours and motor stereotypies (Fombonne et al., 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
80 
 
 
1994). Thus, perhaps only a minority of cases may feature significantly different levels of 
severity in the core impairments.  
The results of the cluster analysis indicated how a dimensional classification could be 
derived using ToM as classifier. This analysis revealed that classification according to ToM 
ability seems to be related to symptom severity and adaptive functioning (as has previously 
been reported by Fombonne et al., 1994; Frith et al., 1994; Lerner et al., 2010), making it 
useful as an indicator of level-of-functioning. The cluster analysis also suggests which tests 
would be most useful in order to best distinguish the categories on a shorter ToM test battery. 
The Unexpected-Contents and Location-Change False Belief tests discriminated best between 
Cluster A and the other two clusters, while the Lies and Jokes and Faux Pas tests 
discriminated effectively between Clusters B and C. 
To conclude, the problems associated with the current diagnostic criteria have made it 
necessary to reconsider the current ASD categories. Firstly, the heterogeneity found within 
PDD-NOS reduces the usefulness of having such a category;  secondly, the current DSM 
criteria do not allow for developmental growth; in other words, the possibility that some 
children first diagnosed with autism may develop into a more Asperger-like picture. A better 
classification system is therefore needed to distinguish between differences within ASD. A 
single autistic disorder category would emphasise the similarity between the ASDs and 
potentially create better service delivery, but (like PDD-NOS) may be too broad to be 
practically useful. Regarding the large ToM differences observed between high-functioning 
autism and Asperger‘s syndrome, I suggest that some distinction between different levels of 
ability needs to be made if these diagnostic categories are to be grouped into one in the DSM-
V, especially since social cognition is a core feature of ASD. Two options, namely (1) 
changing the diagnostic criteria for Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS, and (2) creating 
levels-of-functioning within autistic disorder were discussed. Regarding option 2, problems 
remain with a dimensional rating system based on a single factor; however, a 
multidimensional system may be difficult to implement in practise. A single factor 
classification based on ToM may be useful to identify children at different levels of 
functioning. In identifying the severity of symptoms and adaptive functioning of an 
individual, it is hoped that such a classification would be able to indicate best-practise 
intervention, predict outcome, and chart social-communicative development. 
 
General Comments on the ToM Battery. The age ranges at which different ToM 
skills were present in the typically developing group were roughly consistent with previously 
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reported results from the UK and USA (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1994; 
Wellman & Woolley, 1990). However, some ToM tasks were found to be more difficult than 
others that were in the same module. For instance, all the groups found the Desire task much 
more difficult than the other tasks in the early module, and more difficult even than some of 
the basic ToM tasks such as Sticker Hiding and Explanation of Action. Steele et al. (2003) 
used the same set of tests in their early and basic ToM modules, and found that the Desire 
task, although more difficult than the Pretend Play task, was easier than the Perception-
Knowledge and False Belief tasks from the basic module. These contrasting results may mean 
that cultural bias or some difference in the presentation of the task might have made the 
Desire task difficult for this South African sample.  
Many of the children also found the Second-Order False Belief task more difficult than 
Strange Stories, though previous research suggested that second-order false belief is necessary 
to understand the difference between many non-literal statements, such as the difference 
between a lie and an ironic statement (Ackerman, 1981; M. R. Pollio & H. R. Pollio, 1979). 
This seemingly paradoxical result may be due to the fact that the Strange Stories task contains 
a number of different false statements – lies, jokes, pretending, double bluff, persuasion and 
irony. The double bluff story was the only one that required participants to explicitly state the 
second-order belief processes (―the prisoner knows that the other army thinks that he will lie, 
so he tells the truth to prevent them finding the tanks‖). The other statements did not require 
such explicit explanations. The pretend play statement in this task merely required children to 
understand the distinction between reality and imagination (which typically develops at 
around 3-4 years) and was easily understood by even the youngest typically developing 
children in the sample. Most children also understood lying – in fact, in young and autistic 
children ―s/he was lying‖ was the most common response, even when this response was not 
appropriate for the question. Thus, children may have found the Second-Order False Belief 
task more difficult than Strange Stories because of the range of easier stories included within 
the latter test. 
Interestingly, the low and high-functioning autism groups performed much better on the 
Unexpected-Contents False Belief (Smarties) task than on the Location-Change False Belief 
(Sally-Anne) task, while the other groups performed similarly on both tasks. The largest 
difference between autism and the other groups was that the autism groups had much lower 
verbal IQ scores (though the difference between high-functioning autism and PDD-NOS was 
negligible). Therefore a possible explanation for the poorer performance on the Location-
Change task is that it required giving explanations, whereas the Unexpected-Contents task 
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simply required one-word answers. Another possible explanation for the poor performance on 
the Location-Change task is its presentation as a picture story, whereas real objects were 
shown in the Unexpected-Contents task. Perhaps the autism groups found it easier to reason 
about others‘ beliefs if the object on which the false belief was based was physically present; 
in other words, the picture story might have added another level of abstraction that needed to 
be understood to make inferences about mental states. However, the results of Wellman et 
al.‘s (2001) meta-analysis do not support any of these arguments: they found that neither the 
type of false belief task presented, nor the medium in which the tasks were presented, nor 
what type of response was required (pointing, yes/no answers, or longer verbalisations) made 
any differences in the age at which children passed false belief tasks. However, it should be 
noted that these authors only included typically developing children in their study, so it is 
possible that these results cannot be generalised to children with autism. Similar to the results 
of the meta-analysis, the typically developing children in this study performed equally well on 
the different false belief tasks.   
In summary, the overall performance of typically developing South African children 
was similar to that found in previous international research. However, performance differed 
from what was expected for some of the tasks on the battery. These results suggest that the 
order or content of the battery may need to be revised in future research. More research into 
the reasons for the autism groups‘ inconsistent performance on the different false belief tasks 
would be useful. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Home language. There were significant differences in home language between the 
groups. However, although there were differences in home language, all the children were 
assessed in their language of schooling (either Afrikaans or English). Therefore, 
dissimilarities in home language should not have affected test results. An interesting 
observation was that the PDD-NOS and Asperger‘s syndrome groups were almost exclusively 
English speaking. The group differences found may therefore be an indication that many 
children with ASD are either unidentified or misdiagnosed in certain language groups. Future 
research is needed to examine the prevalence of ASD in South Africa in diverse cultural 
groups. 
 
Diagnosis. The diagnosis of ASD was made independently of this study by several 
different clinicians. It is possible that these clinicians‘ diagnoses do not correspond to each 
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other – it is well documented that considerable disagreement exists between clinicians, 
especially concerning the diagnostic categories Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS (Howlin 
& Asgharian, 1999; Williams et al., 2008). This was a limitation that was borne out of 
necessity, as I am not qualified to make a diagnosis of autism myself, and it was not 
financially or practically possible to hire a clinical psychologist to individually diagnose all 
the children who participated in the study. I aim to address this limitation in future research 
by incorporating diagnostic tools such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2001)  and the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R; Lord, 
Rutter, & LeCouteur, 2003). 
 
Language and cognitive barriers in the ASD group. The study aimed to include 
early-developing theory of mind tasks and tests adapted for participants with limited 
expressive language in order to gain access to the low-functioning autism population. Task 
adaptations included non-verbal tests, such as Pretend Play and Sticker Hiding, and tests 
given in multiple choice formats where participants simply had to point to the answer. 
However, though the tests were adapted to make them accessible for children with autism, the 
tasks proved to be too cognitively demanding for many low-functioning and young autistic 
children. 
 Only 47% of enrolled children with ASD under the age of 7 years were able to 
complete the tasks. These children are therefore not representative of ‗typical‘ ability or 
development, but rather represent the most high-functioning children in this age range. 
Similarly, only 32% of children with low-functioning autism, regardless of their age, were 
able to complete the tasks. Thus, the low-functioning sample represents a minority within this 
diagnostic category who have the cognitive ability to complete ToM tasks. The problems 
most often encountered were that the child‘s receptive language was too poor to be able to 
follow instructions, the child was unable to choose an option out of the multiple choice 
layout, and that the child did not mimic the instructor, and therefore could not complete the 
Sticker Hiding task.  
Additionally, some caution should be taken when interpreting the ToM performance of 
those children with autism who could participate in the research. There were significant 
between-group differences in the number of control questions answered correctly. The low 
and high-functioning autism groups, who only managed to get half of the control questions 
right, did particularly poorly. Although these groups performed poorly on the control 
questions, their performance on ToM questions was significantly poorer. In contrast to this, 
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the typically developing group did equally well on the control and ToM questions. These 
results indicate that although the ASD groups‘ performances may have been influenced by 
their comprehension skills, their performance on theory of mind tasks cannot be attributed 
solely to language ability. For example, ToM deficits were also observed on the relatively 
non-verbal Sticker Hiding task. Many children, especially those with low-functioning autism, 
did not understand the concept of ‗hiding‘ at all, and would simply take the sticker for 
themselves when it was handed to them with the instruction to hide it. This behaviour 
illustrated the general lack of social reciprocity found within this group. 
Regarding the cluster analysis, a fourth group, consisting of those children who did not 
have the cognitive skills to be able to participate in this study, could speculatively be added to 
the three clusters identified. Although this group could not participate in the research, they are 
important to keep in consideration as long-term prognosis is the least favourable for children 
with severe intellectual disability and absence of language (Nordin & Gillberg, 1998). To be 
able to include more ASD children in research, future ToM projects need to focus on the 
development of simple, non-verbal tasks, which require only limited cognitive skills. For 
example, useful skills to assess include greeting behaviour, eye contact, response to calls and 
responsiveness to social cues from the examiner. These tasks assess basic or precursor ToM 
abilities such as joint attention, and do not require extensive language or cognitive skills. 
 
Culturally inappropriate test materials. Some of the content of, and the language 
used in, the more advanced ToM tasks was not culturally relevant to a South African sample. 
For example, in one of the Strange Stories scenarios, a character threatens to drown kittens 
that she cannot keep. The story makes it clear that the character does not wish to hurt the 
kittens and it is therefore assumed that she is lying in an attempt to persuade the protagonist to 
buy a kitten. However, in the South African context, especially in rural and township areas, 
unwanted animals are considered pests and the animal rights movement is less prominent than 
in the UK. Hence, many children believed that the story character was telling the truth. This 
can be seen as a different cultural viewpoint on treatment of unwanted animals, rather than a 
failing of ToM per se. Another example was the Lies and Jokes task, where the protagonist 
told their parent or teacher something that is not true. Participants had to say whether the 
protagonist (1) lied to prevent getting caught, or (2) made a joke because he or she was 
embarrassed. Though the reasoning behind the statement was alluded to in the question (i.e., 
the child is embarrassed because the parent knows he or she did something wrong or the child 
will lie to prevent the parent from knowing that he/ she did something wrong), very few 
Un
ive
r i
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
85 
 
 
children ever said that the child was joking. It is possible that participants in this sample 
tended to interpret the child‘s false statement as a lie rather than as a joke because a joke 
seemed inappropriate in a setting where the child is talking to an authority figure. 
Although obviously foreign elements (such as baseball bats) and language were 
changed beforehand to make the stories more accessible for a South African population, an 
in-depth adaptation needs to be done, specifically with the advanced ToM battery, and some 
stories may need to be removed altogether and replaced with new stories. 
 
Follow-up study. A limitation of the follow-up study was that an alternate battery was 
not used from Time 1 to Time 2, so that it is possible that the children could have learnt the 
correct answers and that this falsely increased their scores at Time 2. However, none of the 
examiners ever gave the children the correct answers to the tasks. The strongest argument 
against the possibility that seeing the tests twice increased children‘s performance at Time 2 is 
that children did not perform better on the control questions at Time 2, even though their 
answers on these questions were corrected at Time 1.  
Other limitations of the study are the short follow-up period and small number of 
children who were reassessed. The significant change in ToM that was observed over the 
period of 1-year suggests that development can take place and that it can occur over a 
relatively short space of time. Future research should focus on longitudinal studies of ToM in 
both low and high-functioning ASD. Furthermore, longitudinal studies with large sample 
sizes would be beneficial. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study investigated the universality and stability of ToM within the subtypes of 
ASD. Understanding how ToM varies across the lifespan and between ASD subtypes is 
important for understanding aetiology, for planning effective intervention strategies and for 
diagnostic purposes. An overarching aim of this study was to see whether specific subgroups 
of ASD, based on ToM ability, emerged to validate the diagnostic changes proposed for the 
DSM-V. Understanding ToM within ASD is particularly pertinent as it gives an indication of 
social competence, one of the core deficits in this disorder. 
The main result of this study was that differences in ToM ability emerged between the 
different subgroups of ASD, both cross-sectionally and in the development of ToM. Low-
functioning autism displayed the most impaired ToM skills, followed by high-functioning 
autism and then PDD-NOS. The Asperger‘s syndrome group performed equivalently to 
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typically developing children in the study. Although the low-functioning autism group did not 
display any increase in ToM with increasing age, the high-functioning autism, PDD-NOS and 
Asperger‘s syndrome groups all displayed greater ToM skills with age. At least in higher-
functioning ASD, these results are consistent with the delayed development hypothesis: it was 
found that onset of ToM skills in these groups is severely delayed (except in Asperger‘s 
syndrome), but that ToM seems to develop at a normal rate. In comparison, the lack of ToM 
improvement in low-functioning autism is in agreement with the deviant development 
hypothesis. These findings reveal that a single explanation for ToM deficits may not suffice 
for the entire autism spectrum. 
In terms of the DSM, the results highlight two major problems with the DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria. Firstly, the PDD-NOS group did not have a uniform profile for ToM or 
general cognitive abilities. Secondly, this study shows that Asperger‘s syndrome is not always 
diagnosed strictly to DSM-IV criteria. Depending on the way in which the diagnosis of 
Asperger‘s syndrome was made, research results – in this case ToM performance – may differ 
considerably. As has been shown in this study, large differences in cognitive functioning can 
be found within ASD; however, the presence or absence of early language delay makes little 
difference in current functioning. The debate surrounding cognitive and behavioural 
similarities or dissimilarities between high-functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome has 
lasted for 20 years and no conclusions have yet been reached. We will remain at an impasse 
until a solution has been reached regarding diagnosis.  
Seeing that differences in general cognitive functioning, ToM and executive functioning 
can make a significant impact on an individual's ability to complete activities of daily living, I 
recommend that the criteria for Asperger‘s syndrome and PDD-NOS be revised. If the ASD 
subgroups are to be grouped into a single autistic disorder category, dimensional categories 
within this diagnosis need to be made. A cluster analysis showed that ToM may be a useful 
way in which to create such dimensional categories. Three distinct ToM clusters were found: 
poor ToM, consisting mostly of children with autism; below average ToM, consisting of 
children with high-functioning autism and PDD-NOS; and high ToM, consisting mostly of 
typically developing children and children with Asperger‘s syndrome.  
Dimensional categorization would ideally reflect the level of impairment in the core 
areas of ASD and be an indication of adaptive functioning, prognosis and eventually 
pathology. ToM, which I use in the broad sense of the word to include early developing ToM 
and basic social reciprocity skills, may be a useful way in which to establish such levels-of-
functioning as it reflects the core deficits in social competence found in ASD. This study has 
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shown that ToM ability can discriminate different groups within ASD. By replicating this 
research on larger samples, it will also be possible to establish development norms for the 
different level-of-functioning subtypes, as has been done in typical development.  
Differentiating children by level-of-functioning can contribute greatly to intervention 
strategies. The results of this study suggest that different intervention strategies for children 
with low-functioning autism, high-functioning autism and Asperger‘s syndrome may be more 
useful than a single social skills training approach for all the ASDs. The low-functioning 
group may benefit most from imaginary play opportunities and training in recognizing basic 
emotions. For the high-functioning group it may be most beneficial to learn certain ToM 
skills in a rote manner, for example understanding that other people‘s thoughts and feelings 
may differ from their own and learning some figures of speech and their meaning. Children 
with Asperger‘s syndrome may have reasonably well developed skills to cognitively reason 
about what another person may mean when they say a certain phrase, but may need 
intervention on how to apply this knowledge to a social situation, such as talking with friends, 
meeting new people and learning socially acceptable conduct. 
Similarly, the finding that ToM has the potential to improve affects the way we think 
about autism across the lifespan and should be kept in mind when designing interventions for 
ASD individuals of different ages. However, this does not mean that these individuals do not 
have lifelong social communication difficulties. There has recently been a shift from 
question-and-answer type ToM tasks towards examining eye contact, joint attention, and 
emotional reciprocity. By studying such basic affective tasks, we may be able to identify 
primitive empathic deficits that I argue to be present in ASD, even in individuals with 
relatively strong ToM skills. Such a research avenue may also explain why there is an ‗autism 
picture‘ when ToM deficits are not specific to ASD. To conclude, the areas of social 
reciprocity and empathy hold much promise for broadening our understanding of ToM and of 
ASD. 
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Appendix A 
DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Autistic Disorder 
A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two from (1), and one 
each from (2) and (3): 
1. qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of 
the following: 
a. marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours such as 
eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to 
regulate social interaction 
b. failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
c. a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or 
achievements with other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or 
pointing out objects of interest) 
d. lack of social or emotional reciprocity 
2. qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the 
following: 
a. delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not 
accompanied by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of 
communication such as gesture or mime) 
b. in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability 
to initiate or sustain a conversation with others 
c. stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language 
d. lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play 
appropriate to developmental level 
3. restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and 
activities, as manifested by at least one of the following: 
a. encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and 
restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or 
focus 
b. apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or 
rituals 
c. stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger 
flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements) 
d. persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior 
to age 3 years: (1) social interaction, (2) language as used in social communication, or 
(3) symbolic or imaginative play. 
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett's Disorder or Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder. 
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DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Asperger Disorder 
 
A. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following: 
1. marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours such as eye-to-eye 
gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction 
2. failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
3. a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with 
other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to 
other people) 
4. lack of social or emotional reciprocity 
B.  Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities, as 
manifested by at least one of the following: 
1. encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of 
interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus 
2. apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals 
3. stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or twisting, 
or complex whole-body movements) 
4. persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
C. The disturbance causes clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning. 
D.  There is no clinically significant general delay in language (e.g., single words used by age 
2 years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years). 
E. There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in the development of 
age-appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behaviour (other than in social interaction), and 
curiosity about the environment in childhood. 
F. Criteria are not met for another specific Pervasive Developmental Disorder or 
Schizophrenia. 
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Appendix B 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Dear Parent(s), 
 
Thank you for taking part in our study! 
 
If you would like your child to participate in the study, please complete the demographic 
questionnaire provided. This information is necessary for our study in order to identify any 
possible conditions that would exclude your child from being able to take part in the study 
and to identify possible factors that could influence theory of mind development or spatial 
navigation in any way. UCT administration also requires some information about your 
household to make sure that children from all demographic groups are included, and no 
groups are left out or discriminated against. Therefore please answer all questions as 
accurately and truthfully as possible. 
 
We understand that some of this information may be sensitive, but please be assured that all 
information will be kept strictly confidential. Neither you nor your child will be discriminated 
against, or lose any privileges, as a result of information given. Only certain authorized 
researchers at UCT will be able to view the information. The information will then be saved as 
part of a dataset which may only include information that cannot directly identify you or your 
child. For example, the dataset may not include you or your child’s name, address, telephone 
number, ID number or any other photographs, numbers, codes or so forth that link you or 
your child to the study. If the results of the research are published neither you nor your child 
will be identified in any way. 
 
If you have any queries or concerns please feel free to contact us on 082 597 8518 (Michelle 
Robberts). 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Michelle Robberts 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
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Participant no.: _______ Date: _______________ 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A. Child’s Information: 
1. Name: _____________________   
2. School:_____________________                      
3. Age:  ______ 
4. Date of Birth (dd/mm/yy): ___________ 
5. Sex (circle one):  Male  Female                          
6. Ethnicity:  White   Black  Indian  Coloured            Asian 
  Other                  If other please specify: ____________ 
7. Home Language: ___________ 
8. Handedness (circle one): Left  Right  Ambidextrous 
9. Number of siblings: ___________ 
10. Number of older siblings: ___________ 
11. How often does your child use a computer?  
 
Never  ____A few times a year  ____Once a month  _____ Once a week  _____Every day ____ 
 
12. Has your child ever experienced a head injury? (e.g., being hit on the head with an object and losing 
consciousness as a result)      YES   NO 
If yes, please give details: 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Has your child ever experienced any of the following medical conditions: 
 
  a. Neurological problems (e.g., epilepsy, meningitis, cerebral palsy, encephalitis, Tourette‘s syndrome, 
brain tumour)        YES   NO 
If yes, please specify: ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. Depression       YES   NO 
If yes, please specify: ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
c. Memory problems      YES   NO 
If yes, please specify: ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
d. Problems with their vision     YES   NO 
If yes, please specify: ____________________________________________________________________ 
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e. Problems with their hearing     YES   NO 
If yes, please specify:_____________________________________________________________________ 
f. Is he/she currently taking any prescription medication?  YES   NO 
If yes, what medication(s)? _______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Has your child ever been diagnosed with a social disorder such as conduct disorder or oppositional defiant 
disorder (ODD)?         YES   NO 
If yes, please specify:_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Has your child ever had a communication disorder? (For example: Having problems with understanding or 
producing speech, slow vocabulary development, difficulties recalling words or problems with producing 
sentences appropriate for his/her age.)         
  YES   NO 
If yes, please specify:_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Has your child ever been diagnosed with a pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) such as autism, 
Asperger‘s syndrome, Rett‘s disorder or childhood disintegrative disorder?  (Tick the appropriate block).
    
No developmental disorder_______ 
Autism______ 
Asperger‘s Syndrome________ 
PDD – Not Otherwise Specified________ 
Other (please specify):______________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Has your child ever experienced learning difficulties such as dyslexia or attention-deficit / hyperactivity 
disorder (ADD/ ADHD)?        YES   NO 
If yes, please specify:_____________________________________________________________________ 
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B.  Parent Information:  
 
1. What is the total yearly income of the household in which you live? (Tick the appropriate block):  
[NOTE: This should be total household income, not personal income.]  
 
0-35000:_____________36000-75000:_________76000-125000:____________ 126000-175000:____________ 
176000-225000:_______226000-275000:_______276000-325000:___________326000-375000:____________ 
376000-425000:_______426000-475000:_______476000-525000:___________ more than 526000:__________ 
 
 
2. Highest level of education reached for mother, father and/or guardian (please circle appropriate 
number). 
 
 Biological  
mother 
Biological 
father 
Guardian 
1) 0 years (No Grades / Standards)  
 = Never went to school 
 
2) 1-6 years (Grades 1-6 / Sub A-Std 4)  
 = Didn‘t complete primary school  
 
3) 7 years (Grade 7 / Std 5) 
  = Completed primary school 
 
4) 8-11 years (Grades 8-11 / Stds 6-9) 
  = Some secondary education  
 (didn‘t complete high school) 
 
5. 12 years (Grade 12 / Std 10) 
  = Completed high school 
 
6. 13+ years = Tertiary education  
  Completed university / technikon / college 
 
7. Don‘t know 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
 
 
7. 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
 
 
7. 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
 
 
7. 
 
3. Parental employment: (Please circle appropriate number) 
 
  Biological  
mother 
Biological 
father 
Guardian 
1. Higher executives, major professionals, owners of  large 
businesses 
2. Business managers of medium sized businesses, lesser 
 professions (e.g. nurses, opticians, pharmacists, social 
 workers, teachers) 
3. Administrative personnel, managers, minor 
 professionals, owners / proprietors of small businesses 
 (e.g. bakery, car dealership, engraving business, plumbing 
 business, florist, decorator, actor, reporter, travel agent) 
4. Clerical and sales, technicians, small businesses  
 (e.g. bank teller, bookkeeper, clerk, draftsperson, 
 timekeeper, secretary) 
5. Skilled manual – usually having had training  
 (e.g. baker, barber, chef, electrician, fireman, machinist, 
 mechanic, painter, welder, police, plumber, electrician) 
6. Semi-skilled (e.g. hospital aide, painter, bartender, bus 
1. 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
1. 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
1. 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
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 driver, cook, garage guard, checker, waiter, machine 
 operator) 
7. Unskilled (e.g. attendant, janitor, construction helper, 
 unspecified labour, porter, unemployed) 
8. Homemaker 
9. Student, disabled, no occupation 
 
 
7. 
 
8. 
9. 
 
 
7. 
 
8. 
9. 
 
 
7. 
 
8. 
9. 
 
 
4. Material and financial resources (please circle appropriate number). 
 
Which of the following items, in working order, does your household have? 
Items Yes No 
1. A refrigerator or freezer 
 
2. A vacuum cleaner or polisher 
   
3. A television 
 
4. A hi-fi or music center (radio excluded) 
 
5. A microwave oven 
  
6. A washing machine 
 
7. A video cassette recorder or dvd player 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
5. 
 
6. 
 
7. 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
5. 
 
6. 
 
7. 
 
 
Which of the following do you have in your home? 
Items Yes No 
1. Running water 
 
2. A domestic servant 
   
3. At least one car 
 
4. A flush toilet 
 
5. A built-in kitchen sink 
  
6. An electric stove or hotplate 
 
7. A working telephone 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
5. 
 
6. 
 
7. 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
5. 
 
6. 
 
7. 
 
 
Do you personally do any of the following? 
Items Yes No 
1. Shop at supermarkets 
 
2. Use any financial services such as a bank account, ATM 
card or credit card 
 
3. Have an account or credit card at a retail store 
1. 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
1. 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
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Appendix C 
Education Department Approval 
Navrae 
Enquiries 
Imibuzo 
Dr RS Cornelissen 
 
Telefoon 
Telephone 
IFoni 
(021) 467-2286 
Faks 
Fax 
IFeksi 
(021) 425-7445 
Verwysing 
Reference 
ISalathiso 
20090320-0004 
 
 
Ms Michelle Robberts 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
RONDEBOSCH 
7700 
 
Dear Ms M. Robberts 
 
RESEARCH PROPOSAL: THEORY OF MIND (TOM) DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARISON OF CHILDREN 
WITH AUTISM SPECTUM DISORDERS (ASD) AND TYPICALLY DEVELOPING SOUTH AFRICAN 
CHILDREN. 
 
Your application to conduct the above-mentioned research in schools in the Western Cape has been approved subject to the 
following conditions: 
 
1. Principals, educators and learners are under no obligation to assist you in your investigation. 
2. Principals, educators, learners and schools should not be identifiable in any way from the results of the investigation. 
3. You make all the arrangements concerning your investigation. 
4. Educators‘ programmes are not to be interrupted. 
5. The Study is to be conducted from 26th March 2009 to 30th September 2009. 
6. No research can be conducted during the fourth term as schools are preparing and finalizing syllabi for examinations 
(October to December). 
7. Should you wish to extend the period of your survey, please contact Dr R. Cornelissen at the contact numbers above 
quoting the reference number. 
8. A photocopy of this letter is submitted to the principal where the intended research is to be conducted. 
9. Your research will be limited to the list of schools as forwarded to the Western Cape Education Department. 
10. A brief summary of the content, findings and recommendations is provided to the Director:  Research Services. 
11. The Department receives a copy of the completed report/dissertation/thesis addressed to: 
 The Director: Research Services 
Western Cape Education Department 
Private Bag X9114 
CAPE TOWN 
8000 
We wish you success in your research. 
 
Kind regards. 
 
Signed: Ronald S. Cornelissen 
for: HEAD: EDUCATION 
DATE:  26
th
 March 2009 
 
Wes-Kaap Onderwysdepartement 
 
 
Western Cape Education Department 
 
 
ISebe leMfundo leNtshona Koloni 
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Appendix D 
Consent and Assent Forms 
 
Theory of mind development: A comparison of children with autism spectrum disorders 
and typically developing South African children. 
 
Principal Researcher:  
Susan Malcolm-Smith 
Lecturer 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
021-650-4605 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study comparing theory of mind development in 
children with autism spectrum disorders and typically developing children. Theory of mind is 
the ability to understand what other people want, feel and believe, and being able to predict 
people‘s actions using this knowledge. Thus, theory of mind is very important for everyday 
social interactions. We know that people with autistic spectrum disorders have impaired and 
delayed theory of mind abilities, as well as impaired social and communication skills.  
This study will look at the differences in theory of mind ability between high 
functioning autistic /Asperger‘s syndrome children, low functioning autistic children, and 
typically developing children, aged 3 to 16 years. Approximately 250 children will participate 
in the study. 
Theory of mind has not been studied in South African children. This study will aid in 
the understanding of theory of mind development by seeing whether South African children 
develop these abilities at the same age as previously studied children from other countries. It 
will also increase our understanding of how theory of mind ability differs in low-functioning 
and high-functioning autistic children compared to typically developing children at different 
ages. 
If you consent to your child participating in this study, your child will be involved in 
two cognitive assessment sessions (each about 40-90 minutes long), where abilities like 
memory, language and social perception will be assessed. These abilities are assessed by 
completing several straightforward pencil and paper or computer-based tasks. You, or another 
caregiver, may be present at the testing session. There are no risks involved in participating in 
this study. If at any time during the experiment you or your child finds any of the procedures 
uncomfortable, you are also free to discontinue participation without penalty.  
 We will take strict precautions throughout the study to keep your personal information 
safe and confidential. Your information will be kept without your name or other personal 
identifiers, only a code, in a locked file cabinet or on a password-protected, secure 
computer.The data gathered from this research may be published, but your child‘s 
contribution will remain anonymous.   
 
 
Should you have any questions or queries about the research or your participation, please do 
not hesitate to contact Michelle Robberts: (cell) 082 597 8518, (email) 
Michelle.Robberts@uct.ac.za 
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Consent Form 
 
The study has been explained to me, and my questions have been answered. 
 
I understand that participation in this study is voluntary, and that I may withdraw my child at 
any point. 
 
I understand that my child will not be identified except by an initial, and that this anonymity 
will be maintained throughout the study and when the research is published. 
 
I consent to allow my child to participate in this study. 
 
Child’s name _______________________________________ 
Signature of parent/guardian __________________________ 
Date _______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
I have explained the study to the participant, and in my opinion s/he understands that 
participation is voluntary and is able to give informed consent. 
 
Researcher ________________________________________ 
Signature __________________________________________ 
Date ______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate below if you would like to be notified of future research projects conducted by 
our research group:  
 
______________ (initial) Yes, I would like to be added to your research participation pool 
and be notified of research projects in which I or my child might participate in the future.  
 
Method of contact:  
 
Phone number:   ________________________________ 
Cell phone number:  ________________________________ 
E-mail address:   ________________________________  
Mailing address:  ________________________________  
    ________________________________  
    ________________________________ 
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DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY  
Assent Form 
 
 
Hello! We want to tell you about a research study we are doing. A 
research study is a way to learn more about something.  
 
If you agree to join this study, you will be asked to listen to a few 
stories and look at some pictures. I will then ask you some 
questions about the stories. You will also be asked to do some 
tasks like drawing pictures, telling me about the meaning of some 
words, and building puzzles with blocks.  
 
There will be two sessions, both about an hour and a half long. If 
you get tired, we can take a break at any time. You can also have 
a parent or guardian with you if you want. 
 
You do not have to join this study. It is up to you. No one will be 
mad at you if you don’t want to be in the study or if you join the 
study and change your mind later and stop.  
 
Any questions? 
 
 
 
If you sign your name below, it means that you agree to take part 
in this research study. 
 
  __________________ _____________________________________________  
      Date (MM/DD/YEAR) Signature of Child/Adolescent Participant    
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Appendix E  
Pretend-Attributing Agency Task  
 
This task was changed for the research as the original task (see below) was deemed to be 
gender biased, especially for the ASD group who consisted mostly of male participants. This 
task was about maternal feelings rather than understanding pretend play, and thus the task 
scenarios were changed to be appealing to both boys and girls. 
 
Original task from Kavanaugh, Eizenman and Harris (1997). Young children's understanding 
of pretense expressions of independent agency. Developmental Psychology, 33, 764-770. 
 
Feeding 
 
―The baby is hungry.  Watch what the Mommy doll does.   
Look.  The Mommy doll is getting the baby‘s food.‖ 
E makes Mommy pick up spoon and dip in bowl. 
―Show me what the Mommy doll does next.‖ 
 
Putting to bed 
 
―The baby is tired. Watch what the Mommy doll does. 
  Look.  The Mommy doll is putting the baby into the crib.‖ 
              E makes Mommy put baby in crib.  (Leave blanket on the side of crib.)  
  ―Show me what the Mommy doll does next.‖ 
 
Brushing teeth 
 
―It‘s time to brush the baby‘s teeth.  Watch what the Mommy doll does. 
Look.  The Mommy doll is putting toothpaste onto the baby‘s toothbrush.‖ 
E makes Mommy squeeze toothpaste onto toothbrush. 
―Show me what the Mommy doll does next.‖ 
 
Going outside 
 
―It‘s time for baby to go outside.  Watch what the Mommy doll does. 
Look.  The Mommy doll is getting the baby‘s hat.‖ 
E makes Mommy take hat out. 
   ―Show me what the Mommy doll does next.‖ 
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New pretend task designed for this study: 
 
Four stories are administered in random order.  If the child acted as the agent (e.g., waters 
plant him/herself), the experimenter says, ―That‘s right.  Now show me what Sam the doll 
does.‖  The child‘s response is recorded. 
 
Watering the plants 
 
―It‘s time to water the plants.  
Watch what Sam does. Look. Sam is getting the watering can.‖ 
Experimenter makes doll take watering can. 
―Show me what Sam does next.‖ 
 
Washing the car 
 
―The car is really dirty! It‘s time to wash the car.  
Watch what Sam does. Look. Sam is getting the wash cloth.‖ 
Experimenter makes doll take the cloth. 
―Show me what Sam does next.‖ 
 
Brushing the dog 
 
―It‘s time to brush the dog!   
Watch what Sam does. Look.  Sam is getting the doggy brush.‖ 
Experimenter makes doll take the brush. 
―Show me what Sam does next.” 
 
Feeding the dog 
 
―The dog is hungry! It‘s time to feed the dog.  
Watch what Sam does. Look.  Sam puts the dog food in the bowl.‖ 
Experimenter makes doll put food into the bowl. 
―Show me what Sam does next.” Un
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Appendix F 
Pilot: ToM in Typically Developing South African Children 
The ToM tasks used in this study were first piloted on 19 typically developing South 
African children to see whether the tests are valid to use with a South African sample. If 
cultural factors do not unduly affect task performance, a similar developmental trajectory 
should be observed in the South African sample as in previously used international samples. 
The sample was divided into three age groups: 3-5 years, 6-7 years and 8-13 years. I expected 
to find that false belief reasoning would start develop in Age Group 1, second-order false 
belief reasoning and an understanding of non-literal statements in Age Group 2, and an 
understanding of complex social scenarios (as tested by tasks such as the Faux Pas test) in 
Age Group 3. The characteristics of the sample are given in Table A. 
 
Table A.  
Demographic Information 
Demographic Information TD 
 
N 19 
Age Range (Years: Months) 3:10 - 12:9 
Age (Years)  
 Mean (SD) 8.5 (2.65) 
Sex  
 Male: Female 7: 12 
Language  
 English: Afrikaans: Xhosa 16: 3: 0 
Ethnicity  
 White: Black: Coloured: Indian 10: 1: 7: 1 
Socio-economic status  
 High: Medium: Low: Unknown 11: 4: 2: 2 
Note. ASD = autism spectrum disorder, TD = typical development 
 
Results of the 2008 Pilot Study of the ToM Battery. In Age Group 1, the two 
youngest participants, who were 3 years 10 months (3:10) and 4 years 7 months (4:7) old, 
failed the Basic module (the 3-year-old participant also failed the Early module). The three 
older participants (4:10, 5:1, and 5:9) all passed the Basic module. On average, Age Group 1 
passed the false belief reasoning tasks found in the Basic module (see Table B).  Therefore, 
though the sample size was small, the pilot study gave some indication that false belief 
reasoning develops at around 4 years of age, as is consistent with international literature. 
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Table B.  
Typically Developing Children’s ToM scores on the Early, Basic and Advanced Modules 
 
Age 
Group 
(Years)
 
N 
Early 
ToM 
Control 
(max=8) 
Early 
ToM 
Test 
(max=8) 
Basic 
ToM 
Control 
(max=33) 
Basic 
ToM Test 
(max=33) 
Advanced 
ToM Test 
(max=131) 
Total ToM 
Score 
(max=172) 
Group 
1 
3-5 5 
7.20  
(0.84) 
6.20  
(1.30) 
27.60 
(6.50) 
19.40 
(13.79) 
35.40 
(34.78)
 a
 
61.00 
(47.71)
a
 
Group 
2 
6-7 2 
8.00  
(0.00) 
8.00  
(0.00) 
31.50 
(2.12) 
29.00 
(5.66) 
94.50 
(7.78) 
131.50 
(13.44) 
Group 
3 
8-13 12 
8.00  
(0.00) 
8.00  
(0.00) 
33.00 
(0.00) 
32.50 
(1.73) 
105.58 
(8.35) 
146.08 
(8.88) 
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. The Early Module 
consisted of the Pretend, Desire and Perception-Knowledge subtest. The Basic Module 
consisted of the Explanation of Action, Unexpected-Contents False Belief, Location-Change 
False Belief and Sticker Hiding Tasks. The Advanced Module consisted of the Second-Order 
False Belief, Strange Stories, Lies and Jokes and Faux Pas subtests.  
a 
n = 3 
 
Performance on the advanced battery similarly increased with age (see Table B). 
Children in the age group 3-5 years performed poorly on the Strange Stories and Faux pas 
tasks and, on average, did not pass either of these tasks. Children in the age group 6-7 years 
passed these tasks, but performed more poorly than children in the 8-13 age group (see Table 
C). However, performance on two tasks in this battery, the Second-order False Belief and 
Lies and Jokes tasks, did not show a clear increase with age. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
123 
 
 
Table C.  
Performance on the Advanced Module Subtests   
  Group 1 
(n = 2) 
Group 2 
(n = 2) 
Group 3 
(n = 12) 
  M SD M SD M SD 
Second-Order False 
Belief Control 
 7.00  1.41 7.00  1.41 7.83  0.58 
Second-Order False 
Belief Test 
 5.00  1.41 7.00  1.41 5.83  2.12 
Lie/Joke Control 
 
 8.00  0.00 8.00 0.00 7.33  1.56 
Lie/Joke Test 
 
 5.00  1.41 4.50  2.12 5.58  1.56 
Strange Stories Test 
 
 40.00  1.41 55.50  9.19 62.00  4.24 
Faux Pas Control  34.00  2.83 35.00  7.07 36.50  3.32 
Faux Pas Test  19.50  0.71 27.50  4.95 32.17  4.80 
Total Advanced score  69.50  0.71 94.50  7.78 105.58  8.35 
 
Despite difficulties on some of the advanced ToM tasks, ToM performance showed a 
clear increase with age in the typically developing South African group (see Figure A). This 
developmental trajectory seemed roughly consistent with international reports. Therefore, the 
ToM battery seemed suitable to use in a South African sample, with some adjustments. 
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Figure A. ToM development in typically developing South African children aged 3-
13 years. 
 
Recommendations. The Strange Stories task had no control question. It was 
recommended that 6 control questions from the adult version of this task be added. To reduce 
the length of the task, the ToM questions could be reduced to one example of each non-literal 
statement. 
The task measuring the ability to distinguish a lie from a joke was particularly difficult 
for children of all ages. This may have been due to the different cultural evaluations of the 
scenario. It is possible that participants in this sample always interpreted the child‘s statement, 
―I did a really good job [on the task]‖, as a lie rather than as a joke because a joke seemed 
inappropriate in a setting where the child is talking to an authority figure. It was 
recommended that the phrasing in the task be changed. In the child version the participant is 
simply asked, ―Was he lying or just joking?‖, while in the adult version the participant is 
asked ―Was he lying to avoid getting caught, or joking to cover up his embarrassment?‖ The 
adult rather than the child versions were included in the task. 
The four tasks making up the Advanced Module were not of equal difficulty level. It 
was recommended that the module be split into two so that children would not need to 
complete tasks not appropriate for their developmental level and thereby become 
demotivated. 
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